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FEMINIST THEORY
Nothing can serve as a criticism of a final vocabulary save another
such vocabulary; there is no answer to a redescription save a re-
redescription.
- Richard Rorty, Private Irony and Liberal Hope
Woman must put herself into the text-as into the world and into
history-by her own movement.
- Hlne Cixous, The Laugh of the Medusa2
INTRODUCTION
"Woman" is a troublesome term, in feminism and in law.3 The
category is neither consistently nor coherently constituted in linguis-
tic, historical, or legal contexts. Yet the framework through which wo-
men have sought (and gained) improvements in their legal,
economic, and social status depends upon the ascription of meaning
to the term. Each claim under the Equal Protection Clause or civil
rights statutes implies an affirmative (though perhaps unstated)
"redescription" of the category. Feminist theorists, in turn, offer alter-
native redescriptions of the term as a critique of categories within
both law and feminism. As multiple redescriptions of woman com-
pete for acceptance in law and in feminist legal theory, the question of
the authority of the descriptive voice arises. Wherein lies the legiti-
macy of any particular claim about woman? Is there a transcendent
truth, a "metanarrative"4 of sexual difference, that is, a narrative that
exists outside of contingent, historical notions of gender, against
which we may measure the validity of such a claim? If not, upon what
basis are we to choose among competing redescriptions?
Both the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of gender and feminist
legal theory have generally assumed that some identifiable and de-
1 Richard Rorty, Private Irony and Liberal Hope, in CoN'iNcENCv, IRONY AND SOLIDARY
80 (1989).
2 H1lne Cixous, The Laugh of the Medusa, in NEW FRENCH FEMiNISMS 245 (Elaine
Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron eds., 1981).
3 Judith Butler recently made a similar observation, see JUDrrH BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE vii-ix, 2-3 (1990), but it has been at the core of much feminist theory throughout
this century. Virginia Woolf commented on the troubling nature of woman as reflected in
the interest men have shown in defining her, making her "the most discussed animal in the
universe." VIRGINIA WooLu, A ROOM OF ONE'S OwN 39 (1931). Similarly, two decades
later, Simone de Beauvoir asked "What is a woman?" and proceeded to explain the trouble
created by any particular answer to that question. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX
xv-xvi (1953). Feminists more recently have suggested that to ask the question "What is a
woman?" is itself to invite trouble. See BUTLER, supra at 3; LUCE IRiGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS
NOT ONE 78 (Catherine Porter trans., 1985). It is the inevitable asking and answering of
this question in law that is the subject of this Article.
4 Lyotard uses the term "metanarrative" or "metadiscourse" to refer to the legitimat-
ing explanation of truth claims, for example, the Enlightenment metanarrative "in which
the hero of knowledge works toward a good ethico-political end-universal peace." See
JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE xxiii-xxiv
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
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scribable category of woman exists prior to the construction of legal
categories. For the Court, this woman-whose characteristics admit-
tedly have changed over time-serves as the standard against which
gendered legal classifications are measured. For feminism, her exis-
tence has served a different but equally important purpose as the sub-
ject for whom political goals are pursued. To the extent that the
definitions of the category diverge, the differences among definitions
are played out in feminist critiques of the Court's gender jurispru-
dence, and, occasionally, in the Court's response to those critiques.
Despite such differences, both the Supreme Court and its femi-
nist critics have largely treated the analysis of gender categories as a
problem of accuracy. For the Court, the validity of gender classifica-
tions depends upon their correspondence to a set of gendered norms
that the Court accepts as true or real or in some sense independent of
legal categories. The response of feminist legal theorists to this analy-
sis has been either to challenge the Court's conclusions about the ac-
curacy of the correspondence 5 or more recently, to challenge the set
of norms against which the gender categories are measured.6 Neither
response displaces the Court's basic construction of the problem as
one of assessing the accuracy of a particular account of gender differ-
ence. Indeed, feminist efforts to offer truer or better stories of wo-
men's experience-and to justify those stories through feminist
method-assume that there is an underlying truth to be told.
To the extent that these legal accounts of gender, both main-
stream and feminist, endeavor to assess the accuracy of gender catego-
ries, they represent a mode of argument that tracks foundationalist or
objectivist assumptions about knowledge.7 That is, their authority or
persuasiveness rests upon their perceived correspondence to a reality
that exists independent of legal discourse.8 These accounts depend
5 See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/
Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-85) (challenging the
Court's treatment of pregnancy as gender difference and arguing that pregnancy should
be understood in a gender-neutral, functional way).
6 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND
LAw 32-45 (1987) (noting the way in which discrimination doctrine "[c]onceal[s] .. . the
substantive way in which man has become the measure of all things").
7 Foundationalism may be defined simply as the attempt to find some sort of ground-
ing for our ultimate truth claims. The rejection of foundationalism has a long pedigree
but has been perhaps most fully elaborated by Richard Rorty in PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIR-
ROR OF NATURE (1979). Rorty explains the quest for foundations as the desire "to get
behind reasons to causes, beyond argument to compulsion from the object known, to a
situation in which argument would be notjust silly but impossible .... To reach that point
is to reach the foundations of knowledge." Id. at 159.
8 I do not mean to imply that the legal arguments discussed in this Article necessarily
reflect a commitment to a foundationalist theory of knowledge. Indeed, I wish to distin-
guish my analysis of legal discourse from a broader philosophical critique of epistemology.
This Article does not attempt to address the philosophical debate over the nature of rea-
son. Instead, it explores the implications for legal analysis of constructing arguments pre-
1538 [Vol. 80:1536
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therefore upon the identification of secure foundations for (gender)
knowledge that are in some sense free of historical, political, or social
contingency. Such modernist 9 or objectivist assumptions have been
under attack for decades within the academy.10 More recently, leftist
legal critics have borrowed the insights and tools of antifoundational-
ist philosophy to call into question law's claim to rationality and legiti-
macy.'" Even more recently, some scholars have begun to question
whether the postmodern 12 or antifoundationalist view of knowledge
as contingent promotes or threatens progressive social movements
such as feminism, whatever its usefulness in challenging the validity of
existing legal norms.' 3
mised on objectivist assumptions about gender. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and
the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. Ray. 1331, 1334 (1988) (suggesting that "[floundationalism
has been the prevailing style of recent constitutional scholarship").
9 I define "modernism" loosely as a form of thought that seeks to create a general
theory about the representation of nature in the mind. The modernist or foundationalist
theory of representation provides a cross-cultural and trans-historical account of truth and
rationality that in turn serves as a basis for social criticism. See Roarv, supra note 7, at 131-
64.
10 Within continental philosophy, see, e.g.,JAcQuEs DEmDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 6-65
(Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976); LYOTARD, supra note 4. Within the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, see, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STmucruRE OF SciENric REVOLUTONS (2d ed. 1970);
RoRT, supra note 7.
11 See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YAu LJ.
997 (1985); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HIAv\ L. REv.
1276 (1984); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984); Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YAE LJ. 1 (1984).
12 Postmodernism is a disputed term, one not susceptible to simple definition. For
the purposes of this Article, I am concerned with the relationship between ideas and social
practices and particularly with postmodernism's denial that ideas exist apart from the prac-
tices in which they are embodied. SeeLYoTARD, supra note 4, at xxiv (defining postmodern-
ism as "incredulity toward metanarratives"). In addressing the utility of
antifoundationalism to legal arguments, I discuss both self-described postmodernists, such
as Lyotard, and philosophers who reject the term, such as Richard Rorty. See Richard
Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, in 13 THE TANNER LEcruRES oN HuMAN VALUES 1, 13 n.18
(Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1992) (explaining that he is "not fond of the term postmodernism,"
but conceding certain similarities between his positions and those of Lyotard).
13 CompareJohn Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARv. L. Rxv. 332, 399 (1986)
(arguing that scholars should stop focusing on questions of methodology and, instead,
address questions of social change and social justice directly) and Lynn A. Baker, 9ust Do
It'. Pragmatism and Progressive Social Change, 78 VA. L. REv. 697 (1992) (arguing pragmatism
is of little use for achieving progressive social change) with Mar J. Matsuda, Pragmatism
Modfied and theFalse Conscioumess Problem, 63 S. CAi. L. Ray. 1763, 1763-64 (1990) (arguing
that pragmatism has the potential to empower the least powerful social groups); Martha
Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context 63 S. CAi- L. REv. 1597, 1601 (1990) (arguing
for "contextual" understanding of the issue and rejecting arguments that such an ap-
proach risks powerlessness or political paralysis); Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Femi-
nism/Law, 77 ComELL L. Rrv. 254 (1992) (arguing that feminist jurisprudence cannot
afford to ignore the lessons of postmodernism); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and
the Feminis4 63 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1699, 1699-1700 (1990) (suggesting that pragmatism, rather
than a general theory, provides the only solution for feminists in a world of nonidealjus-
tice); Joseph W. Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between
Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1821, 1821-22 (1990) (arguing that for
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Rather than addressing the abstract critique of reason that is at
the heart of the postmodernist project, this Article attempts to link
the critique of epistemology implicit in that argument to the more
immediate issue of the utility of the postmodern position to feminist
legal theory. I am less concerned, therefore, with law's broad claims
of objectivity and rationality than with the ways in which those claims
affect particular legal arguments. Thus, this Article does not address
the possibility of objectivity in a philosophical sense but the conse-
quences for legal theory of adopting objectivist modes of argument.
Whatever the epistemological status of knowledge claims about gen-
der, when those claims are translated into the legal realm, they as-
sume a regulatory function. Thus, while feminist philosophers debate
the status of rationality and objectivity,14 the critical question for femi-
nist legal theorists is not a metaphysical one but a practical one: when
courts treat gender as pre-existing legal discourse, discoverable
through a neutral process called legal reason, what are the implica-
tions for the regulation and redescription of gender categories?
This Article argues that one implication of the objectivist assump-
tions underlying both legal and feminist accounts of gender is a ten-
dency toward reliance on broad explanatory metanarratives of gender
difference. Such reliance has at least two important consequences:
First, by assuming that there exists a prepolitical answer to questions
of gender, we tend to insulate from scrutiny the standard against
which gender is measured, accepting that standard as natural and
prior to our own participation in its construction. Second, by analyz-
ing gender categories for their correspondence with a standard that is
presumed neutral or objective, we shift responsibility for the creation
and maintenance of gender away from the critic. In short, the resort
to explanatory metanarratives is depoliticizing, casting controversial
normative issues in the guise of objectively answerable questions. This
Article argues that both mainstream legal accounts and feminist ac-
counts of gender exhibit these weaknesses.
Exploring the Supreme Court's analysis of gender in a range of
cases, Part I argues that the Court's treatment of gender as a problem
of accurate correspondence stems from an effort to defend the valid-
ity of its own choices about how gender differences matter. This Part
traces the Court's resort to a series of legitimating narratives or princi-
ples of gender difference and argues that, by relying on narratives of
difference presumed to lie outside the scope of legal discourse, the
oppressed groups, theory matters); Joseph William Singer, Should Lauyers Care About Philos-
ophy., 1989 DuxE LJ. 1752, 1765-66 (book review).
14 Compare Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the
Law, 107 HAtv. L. REv. 714 (1994) with Nancy Fraser & LindaJ. Nicholson, Social Criticism
Without Philosophy, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 19 (LindaJ. Nicholson ed., 1990).
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Court both avoids responsibility for the political implications of those
. narratives and reinforces their power. Part I illustrates this analysis by
examining in detail the Court's reasoning in Bray v. Alexandria Wo-
men's Health Clinic,15 in which the Court considered the connection
between anti-abortion protesting and anti-woman animus. Part I con-
cludes that the Supreme Court's reliance on biological differences as
a guide to gender shields from the Court's scrutiny the social meaning
attached to such differences.
Part II explores feminist legal theory's reliance on its own legiti-
mating narratives of woman. It begins by examining various broad
theories of gender difference and women's oppression upon which
feminist legal theorists have relied; it then suggests that no theory has
offered a stable and coherent basis for feminist advocacy. On the con-
trary, each has created division and dissent. Part II next discusses fem-
inist legal theory's tentative move toward antifoundationalist theory as
a response to the indeterminacy of the category "woman" but notes
that feminists have been hesitant to embrace fully the implications of
postmodernism. Exploring this ambivalence through an examination
of the conflicting accounts of womanhood and abortion presented in
the briefs filed in Bray, Part II argues that objectivist assumptions in
feminist theory, no less than in mainstream legal theory, serve to ob-
scure the exclusions upon which gender categories are based.
Finally, Part III discusses the implications both for the Supreme
Court's gender jurisprudence and for feminist legal theory of aban-
doning objectivist accounts of gender in favor of postmodemist as-
sumptions of contingency and social construction. Turning once
again to the competing claims of narrative authority in Bray, this Part
considers whether an antifoundationalist approach to the Court's gen-
der jurisprudence undermines the power of feminist critique. Part III
concludes that both feminists and the Court should acknowledge the
normative assumptions that underlie their justificatory claims and
take responsibility for the exercise of power those claims entail.
I
GENDERED LEGAL CATEGORIES: DRAWING LINES AND
RECREATING BOUNDARIES
A. Legitimating Difference: The Search for a Metanarrative
As the Supreme Court has attempted to draw and redraw the
boundaries of gender categories, particularly in the context of equal
protection jurisprudence, it has necessarily confronted the problem of
the legitimacy of its own gendered assumptions. The Court's treat-
ment of gender-based classifications therefore may be understood as a
15 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
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quest for an acceptable justificatory theory of gender, one rooted
safely outside gender politics. Such a quest depends upon the as-
sumption that a verifiable correspondence exists between legislative
classifications and an underlying reality of gender difference.
The challenge, as the Court has defined it, is to identify that real-
ity of difference and review gender classifications accordingly. How-
ever, the Court's account of gender difference has not remained
stable or consistent. It has relied at various times on an ideology of
separate spheres, simple social empiricism, and biological sex differ-
ence as sources of authority in recreating the categories of women
and men. Each source has been challenged, each is unstable, and
together they have led the Court to conflicting results.
This section examines the Court's use of these various accounts
and argues that, as the Supreme Court has assessed gender categories,
it has not merely regulated gender through the limitation and control
of the uses of gender in legal discourse. Rather, by defining and rede-
fining the category woman, the Supreme Court has participated in the
cultural process of defining womanhood itself, not simply the legal
implications that follow from it. Moreover, the Court has done so in a
manner that has tended to conceal its own role in the production of
gender categories by treating gender (however defined) as
prepolitical.
1. Separate Spheres and "the Law of the Creator"
The Court's struggle with the legitimation of gendered legal cate-
gories began in the very first case to challenge a sex-based classifica-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6 Rejecting Myra Bradwell's
challenge to Illinois' denial of her application to the bar-a denial
based on her status as a married woman' 7-Justice Bradley in concur-
rence cited the "law of the Creator" as support for the exclusion of
16 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). Although based on the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause, Bradwell's lawyer's
arguments were premised on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equality. He
argued:
Intelligence, integrity and honor are the only qualifications that can be pre-
scribed as conditions precedent to an entry upon any honorable pursuit or
profitable avocation, and all the privileges and immunities which I vindi-
cate to a colored citizen, I vindicate to our mothers, our sisters and our
daughters.
LEsUE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, THE CONsTrrTUoNAL RIGHS oF WOMEN 68 (1988) (quoting
Brief for Petitioner).
In fact Bradwell was one of the first Supreme Court cases to present a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to any legislation. Bradwell was argued several weeks before The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), although the Supreme Court handed
down that decision one day before the decision in BradwelL
17 Bradwel 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 131.
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women from the legal profession.18 Having dissented from the
Court's narrow interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
in the Slaughter-House Cases a day before,19Justice Bradley nevertheless
concurred in Bradwell v. Illinois based on his view that "[t] he para-
mount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and be-
nign offices of wife and mother."20 Joined by Justices Field and
Swayne, Justice Bradley argued that nature maintained separate
"spheres" for men and women. He explained that "the rules of civil
society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and can-
not be based upon exceptional cases."' For Justice Bradley, there-
fore, the Court's demarcation of gender categories merely tracked
what he perceived as the natural social order, the logic of which exis-
ted independent of the legal order.22
This "separate spheres" ideology pervaded the Court's early cases
involving challenges to protective labor legislation. For example, in
Muller v. Oregon2 3 the Court reviewed an Oregon statute proscribing
the employment of women in factories for more than ten hours per
day.24 In response to the Court's assertion in Lochner v. New Yor2 5
that it was not reasonable to believe that maximum-hours legislation
for bakers promoted public health,2 6 Louis Brandeis filed a famous
brief in which he devoted over a hundred pages to a discussion of the
relationship between hours of labor and the health and morals of wo-
men.2 7 Relying on arguments presented in the brief, the Court in
Muller distinguished its decision in Lochner and held that woman's
"physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal func-
tions-having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of
the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as
18 Id. at 141.
19 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
20 Bradwell 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
21 Id. at 141-42.
22 The Court's use of the perceived natural social order as ajustification for legislative
classifications was not limited to gender. Upholding a Louisiana statute requiring railroads
to provide separate accommodations for "the white and colored races," the Court in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896), held that "[i]n determining the question of rea-
sonableness [Louisiana] is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, cus-
toms and traditions of the people .... Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts
or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can
only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation."
23 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
24 Id. at 416-17.
25 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26 Id. at 58.
27 See Brief for Defendant, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), reprinted in 16
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTI-
TUTONAL LAW 63-178 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
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the passion of man."28 Almost thirty years later, in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parish,29 the Court overruled its decision in Lochnet ° but contin-
ued to rely on women's special vulnerability as a justification for the
gender-based minimum wage standard.3'
Following the Supreme Court's rejection of economic substantive
due process in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, advocates of women's
rights turned to the Equal Protection Clause as a constitutional basis
for challenging legislation restricting women's employment. Yet, in
these decisions too, the strength of separate spheres ideology under-
mined arguments for legal equality. For example, in Goesaert v.
ClearP2 the Court rejected a challenge to a Michigan statute restrict-
ing women's employment as bartenders. Justice Frankfurter noted
that "bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment,
give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise pre-
ventive measures."33 Thus, the strength of the Court's presumption of
the inherent differences in men's and women's roles prevented it
from piercing the veil of ideological justifications3 4 for limitations on
women as lawyers,3 5 bartenders,3 6 or voters.3 7
2. Social Facts and Legal Norms
A century after Bradwell, simple reliance on the logic of separate
spheres had become increasingly problematic for the Court Social
consensus regarding the natural inevitability of gender categories had
broken down, and gender had become a site of political contest. This
breakdown of consensus was reflected within the Court itself in the
28 208 U.S. at 422; see also Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 295 (1924) (upholding
restrictions on women's employment and citing Muller with approval).
29 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
30 Id. 391.
3' Id. at 394-95, 400.
32 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
33 Id. at 466. Applying rational basis review, the Court refused to "give ear to the
suggestion that the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male
bartenders to try to monopolize the calling." Id. at 467.
34 Although social science data were introduced in a number of these cases to support
restrictions on women's employment, see, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 n.1
(1908), the Court did not view such data as imposing a responsibility on legislatures to
accommodate changing norms. As Justice Frankfurter explained in Goesaert, "The Consti-
tution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social stan-
dards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards."
335 U.S. at 466. In other words, sociological data consistent with legislative categories
could justify those categories, but data inconsistent with legislative uses of gender would
not necessarily render a statute unconstitutional. By the 1970s, the Court had reversed its
approach, using sociological data as a standard against which to measure gender catego-
ries. See infra part 1A2.
35 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
36 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
37 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (rejecting a Privileges and Im-
munities Clause challenge to Missouri's gender-based restrictions on voting).
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Justices' differing notions of gender. In an effort to decide cases im-
plicating the increasingly politicized issue of gender difference and, at
the same time, to defend its own legitimacy, the Court turned from
Justice Bradley's natural law rationale to a more searching use of so-
cial empiricism and biological difference-a move foreshadowed by
the Brandeis brief in Muller.38 This new empiricism allowed the Court
to invoke social or biological reality to ground its gender decisions
within the factual context of a particular case.
Under its modern social empiricist approach, the Court's review
of gender classifications became an essentially negative process of
rooting out false stereotypes by comparing legislative assumptions
with empirical facts. Recognizing the risk that legislative distinctions
could be based on "gross, stereotyped distinctions between the
sexes,"3 9 the Court examined gender-based categories for evidence of
gender stereotyping-the indulgence of false assumptions about the
correspondence of biological sex and particular culturally-defined be-
havior or views. Implicit in this mode of analysis is the modernist no-
tion that, for the purposes of legal analysis, there exists an underlying
truth about gender, the distortion of which constitutes sexism.40 The
Court assumed that this truth was reflected, albeit imperfectly, in so-
cial practices and thus was discoverable through empirical inquiry.
For example, in Stanton v. Stanton,41 the Court struck down a
Utah statute establishing a lower age of majority for females than for
males.42 The Court rejected the state's justification that women ma-
ture more quickly, marry earlier, and require less education than
men. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, found that "[n]o
longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of
the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of
ideas."43 The validity of the statute, the Court indicated, depended
upon its correspondence with the reality of men's and women's con-
38 Brief for Defendant, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), reprinted in 16
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw 63-178 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
39 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
40 Of course, the Court's approach to gender categories operates as a limit on the
scope of the Equal Protection Clause and may reflect a normative view of the limits of the
Constitution in shaping social norms. The point here is that by analyzing gender as
though it preexists politics, the Court does not confront the implications of that limitation.
Cf. MACKINNON, sup ra note 6, at 37 (noting that equal protection as a principle of antidis-
crimination prevents taking into account structural gender inequality).
41 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
42 Id. at 18.
43 Id. at 14-15.
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temporary activities. The Court found the statute invalid because it
was inaccurate and outdated.44
Similar reasoning informed the Court's decisions in Reed v. Reed45
and Frontiero v. Richardson.46 In Reed, the Court invalidated an Idaho
probate law that established a "mandatory preference" for men over
women as administrators of estates, finding the preference simply an
"arbitrary legislative choice."47 Frontiero involved the right of a female
member of the armed services to claim her husband as a "dependent"
for the purpose of certain benefit laws.48 The Court found the differ-
ent standards for determining "dependency" for women and men un-
constitutional. 49 In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan challenged
the continued accuracy of the assumption that female spouses were
normally dependent, pointing out the increasing involvement of wo-
men in the labor force, and invoking employment and income statis-
tics to support his analysis.50
Under this approach, when the Court did find a correspondence
between social facts and legislative assumptions, it affirmed gender
classifications. For example, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,51 the Court up-
held a military-promotion regime that provided a shorter "up or out"
period for male members of the armed services than for female mem-
bers.52 Noting that the military barred women from combat assign-
ments, the Court reasoned that women had fewer opportunities than
men had to demonstrate their abilities.53 On this basis, the Court
ruled that the longer "up or out" time for women was justified and
constitutional. 4
44 See id. at 15. The Court explained, "If any weight remains in this day to the claim of
earlier maturity of the female, with a concomitant inference of absence of need for sup-
port beyond 18, we fail to perceive its unquestioned truth . d..
45 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
46 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
47 Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. In Reed, the Court observed that legislative classification must
be" 'reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' " Id. (quoting Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
48 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678.
49 Id. at 679.
50 Id. at 685-88. The Court's conclusion in Frontiero focused on changing social norms
of gender and did not reach gender classifications related to biological difference. Sylvia
Law has noted that the brief Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the American Civil Liberties Union
filed on behalf of Sharon Frontiero specifically distinguished legislative classifications
based on biological difference, implying that such classifications might not raise an equal
protection issue. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. Rxv.
955, 980 (1984).
51 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
52 Id. at 510.
53 Id. at 508.
54 Id. at 510.
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The Court's rejection of inaccurate stereotypes in these cases did
not require a positive theory of sex or gender; it merely required an
eye for false assumptions. Identifying what was false did not necessar-
ily require the Court to make an explicit claim about what was true,
even though the mode of analysis posited a knowable truth about gen-
der difference. Consistent with Justice Bradley's suggestion that "the
rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of
things," 55 the Court based its approach on the assumption that the
"general constitution" of gender roles in society reflected true gender
difference, or at least a realm of gender difference that existed in-
dependent of the law. So long as legal norms accurately reflected
these roles, the law was not implicated in the maintenance of gender
inequality.
This analysis therefore permitted the Court to avoid articulating
an affirmative theory of gender difference apart from the observable
differences in the social roles of men and women. According to the
logic of its analysis, the Court remained innocent of the politics of gen-
der: it simply reviewed the empirical correspondence between the law
and the lives of women and men without making any normative claims
regarding the justice of those differences. 56 In order to maintain this
innocence, however, the Court had to assume the integrity of the
gendered subject independent of legal categories. The lives of men
and women, measured empirically, couid serve as an objective stan-
dard against which to measure the justice of legislative categories only
if they were not themselves constituted by those legal categories.
Thus, the logic of the Court's standard required the denial of its own
participation in defining gender norms.
In Craig v. Boren,57 the Court questioned the logic of this reliance
on social facts as a foundation for gender categories by explicitly ac-
knowledging the relationship between law and the social order of gen-
der. Craig involved an Oklahoma law that established different ages at
which teenage girls and boys were permitted to purchase alcohol.58
The State argued that its legislative distinction was supported by a gen-
der-differentiated risk of drunk driving59 -evidence responsive to the
Court's focus on accuracy in Reed and Stanton.60 Nevertheless, re-
55 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1872).
56 SeeJane Flax, The End ofInnocence, in FEMINSTS THEoRIZE THE PouITICAL 445 (Judith
Butler & John W. Scott eds., 1992) (discussing feminists' desire to exercise power inno-
cently); see also infra at 149.
57 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
58 Id. at 191-92.
59 Id. at 200-01.
60 Id. The Court in Stanton cited women's increasing levels of education and partici-
pation in public life as evidence that the assumptions upon which the state policy was
based were outdated. The Court did note, however, the tendency of the legislative classifi-
cation to reinforce the factual basis upon which it was premised:
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jecting the State's position, Justice Brennan criticized not only the
State's statistics 6' but the very use of statistics to support gender classi-
fications. He suggested that sociological gender differences observa-
ble through statistics may not justify differential treatment because
those differences may themselves be the product of-rather than the
reason for-differential treatment. As Justice Brennan noted, "The
very social stereotypes that find reflection in age-differential laws are
likely substantially to distort the accuracy of these comparative statis-
tics." 62 In effect, the Court in Craig recognized the role that law plays
in constructing and reinforcing gender difference. The statute at is-
sue in Craig contributed to a social climate in which young men who
were drinking and driving were arrested, while young women were
"chivalrously escorted home."63 These attitudes were in turn reflected
in the statistics upon which the statute was based.
The Court concluded in Craig that "proving broad sociological
propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably
is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal
Protection Clause."'64 Thus, in Craig, the Court largely abandoned the
notion that observed social differences between men and women jus-
tify gender-based classifications, except perhaps classifications with a
compensatory purpose. The Court distinguished Kahn v. Shevin65 and
Schlesinger v. Ballard,66 in which it had upheld the use of gender-based
classifications, citing the legislature's laudatory objective in those cases
of remedying socially and legally created disadvantages based on gen-
der.67 By distinguishing cases in which legislative categories reinforce
statistical disparities (Craig) from those in which legislative categories
remedy such disparities (Schlesinger and Shevin), the Court clarified its
use of social statistics and rejected the notion that observed gender
differences in social roles could justify the legal maintenance of those
roles.
To distinguish between the two on educational grounds is to be self-serving:
if the female is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be
expected to attend school as long as he does and bringing her education to
an end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed.
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975).
61 429 U.S. at 201-04. Justice Brennan observed that even if the Court assumed that
the statistics were accurate, the correlation between gender and drunk driving was less
than compelling. He noted, moreover, that the Court had rejected statutes premised on
statistical studies with far greater predictive value than those offered by Oklahoma. Id. at
202.
62 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976) (citation omitted).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 204.
65 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
66 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
67 429 U.S. 190, 198 n.6 (1976).
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J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,68 the Court's most recent equal pro-
tection gender discrimination ruling, confirmed and extended Craig's
logic. In JE.B., a defendant in a paternity action challenged the
state's use of peremptory challenges to remove male jurors from the
jury pool. 69 The Court held that the use of peremptory challenges
based on gender violated the Equal Protection Clause.70 It reached
this conclusion without regard to any empirical evidence of differ-
ences between men's and women's behavior as jurors.7'
In an earlier decision, the Court itself had relied upon the possi-
bility of gender-based empirical differences when it overturned a con-
viction because women had been intentionally and systematically
excluded from the jury:
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made
up exclusively of one is different from a community composed of
both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among
the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not
in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded. 72
68 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
69 Id. at 1421-22. Rejecting defendant's equal protection argument, the Alabama trial
court empaneled the all-female jury. The jury found petitioner to be the father of the
child and ordered him to pay child support. See id. at 1422.
70 Id. at 1430.
71 The Court noted that the evidence in support of gender-specific behavior by jurors
is not substantial. Id. at 1426 n.9. Respondent cited one study that indicated different
attitudes in cases involving sexual assault. See R. HASTIE ET At., INSIDE THEJURY 140 (1983).
But seeV. HANS & N. VIDMARJUDGING THEJURY (1976) (finding "no significant differences
in the way men and women perceive and react to trials"). See generally Shirley S. Abraham-
son, Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REv. 257 (1986) (discussing why jurors should be drawn
from a representative cross-section of society); Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palla-
dium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CrN. L. Rsv. 1139 (1993) (arguing that, under
equal protection analysis, pre-emptory strikes against women should be prohibited); Ed-
mond Constantini et al., Gender and Juror Partiality: Are Women More Likely to Pr4udge Guilt?,
67JuDCAru.E 120 (1983); Deborah L. Forman, What Dfference Does it Make?: Gender and
Juy Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 35 (1992) (examining argument for extending Batson
to gender and for eliminating peremptory challenges altogether); Carol J. Mills & Wayne
E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics: To What Extent Are They Related to Jury Verdicts, 64JUDICA-
TulE 22 (1980).
72 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) (footnotes omitted). Women
were completely excluded from jury service until the nineteenth century, and in some
states, well into the twentieth century. This prohibition was derived from English common
law which, according to Blackstone, rightfully excluded women from juries under "the
doctrine of propter defectum sexus, literally, the 'defect of sex.' " United States v. De
Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RiEs 362).
The traditional arguments against the imposition ofjury service on women were pre-
mised either on a desire to protect women from the atmosphere of the courtroom, see
Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ark. 1949), or on deference to women's roles within
the home and family, see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
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The Court in JE.B rejected not the truth of this finding, but its rele-
vance. The majority concluded that a state actor may not use biologi-
cal sex as a predictor of behavior based on stereotypical assumptions
to eliminate women or men asjurors.73 As in Craig, empirical justifica-
tion for differential treatment was not enough to justify such treat-
ment. As the Court explained, "Even if a measure of truth can be
found in some of the gender stereotypes used to justify gender-based
peremptory challenges, that fact ... cannot support discrimination on
the basis of gender in jury selection."7 4
Stated another way, although the logic of Stanton rooted out false
or inaccurate stereotypes, the logic ofJE.B. limited the use of all gen-
der stereotypes, whether or not they could be shown to have an empir-
ical basis. In this sense, J.E.B. reinforced the logic of Craig empirical
correspondence or the accuracy of the assumptions upon which gen-
der categories are based is not alone an adequate justification for dif-
ferential treatment. Rather, to act upon broadly constructed notions
of gender is unconstitutional, whether or not the actions are indepen-
dently justifiable through reference to the observed behavior of men
and women.
3. Sex, Gender, and Biological Difference
Craig represented a potentially radical alteration in the Court's
analysis of gender. The Court's recognition that social facts do not
exist independent of the constitutive power of the law and cultural
categories, undermined the power of these facts to serve as a prepoliti-
cal basis for gender divisions within law. Thus, the abandonment of
sociological "facts" as a basis for evaluating legislative distinctions left
the Court's jurisprudence unmoored. Having moved beyond the
straightforward rejection of "outmoded stereotypes" to question the
use of gender classifications that have an empirical basis (that teenage
girls are less likely than teenage boys to drink and drive, or that wo-
men jurors are more likely to sympathize with a victim of domestic
violence), the Court faced the problem of justifying its decisions re-
garding the relevance of gender in particular contexts.
One possibility would have been for the Court to recognize its
own participation in the definition of gender categories and to take
responsibility for that participation by articulating a normative vision
of gender equality against which legal uses of gender could be mea-
sured. For example, it might have explored explicitly the connection
73 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
74 Id. at 1427 n.11. The Court continued, "We have made abundantly clear in past
cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal
Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the general-
ization." Id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201 (1976)).
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between gender differences and equality, identifying relevant gender
differences in the context of their social meaning.
Instead, the Court has continued to treat gender as preexisting
the legal categories of man and woman and the issue of sex discrimi-
nation as a matter of accurate correspondence. Having rejected socio-
logical fact as the standard against which accuracy may be assessed,
the Court has turned increasingly to an alternative explanatory
metanarrative of gender difference: biology. 75 An important compo-
nent of separate spheres ideology and early quasi-empirical defenses
of protective labor legislation, biological difference continues to pro-
vide the Court with what it views as an incontestable guide to gender
difference-immutable biological traits that exist independent of
legal and cultural norns. If sociological fact has become a tainted
basis for the legal regulation of gender, as the Court suggests infE.B.,
biology remains a potential guide to difference that is universal and
consistent over time. By preserving biological difference as a measure
of the legitimacy of gender categories, the Court maintains its position
as objective critic, assessing gendered actions for their accuracy while
remaining innocent of gender politics.
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County illustrates this reli-
ance on biological difference.76 In that case, the Court considered
whether California's statutory rape law criminalizing intercourse with
teenage girls, but not teenage boys, violated the Equal Protection
Clause.77 Rejecting the challenge, Justice Rehnquist cited young wo-
men's vulnerability to pregnancy as a justification for the gender-
based distinction 78 and emphasized that "[o]nly women may become
pregnant."79 Different treatment of young men and young women
was justified not by any "outmoded stereotypes" about the roles of
men and women, nor by any social fact about male and female sexual
aggression, but rather by a biological fact: women's unique vulnera-
bility to pregnancy. The Court ruled that this fact, true "by nature,"80
justified the statute's gender-based distinction.
75 Assessing the Burger Court's approach to gender-based classifications, Sylvia Law
has noted that "[t]he Craig standard, condemning explicit sex-based classifications based
on inaccurate stereotypical views of men and women, collapses when applied to explicit
sex-based classifications that are arguably related to real biological differences." Law, supra
note 50, at 988. This limitation was not inevitable, however, given Justice Brennan's focus
in Craig on the role of the law in creating and reinforcing gender difference. This analysis
could have been extended to biological difference as well.
76 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
77 Id. at 466.
78 Id. at 470.
79 Id. at 471.
80 See id. at 473 (noting that "a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to




Yet its talismanic use of biological difference to support the gen-
der-based statutory rape law distracted the Court from a more search-
ing consideration of the role of biology in the case. As Justice Stevens
correctly pointed out in dissent, the biological risk of pregnancy did
not deter young women from engaging in consensual sex.81 By treat-
ing biology as the critical difference, the Court ignored the gender
stereotypes underlying the statute: female chastity and the incapacity
of young women to make choices about sexual intercourse. 82 Ac-
cepting biological difference as ajustification for the statutory distinc-
tion, the Court failed to consider the ways in which biology and the
law intersect to define and reinforce gendered social norms of teen-
age sexuality. 83
That a biological difference in Michael M.-women's vulnerability
to pregnancy-justified gender-based legislation, but differences in
drinking and driving patterns in Craig did not, illustrates the Court's
rejection of social empiricism in favor of biological difference. The
Court treated the cases differently because it accepted the biological
difference of pregnancy as privileged, as logically prior to the social
facts and stereotypes rejected in Craig. California could treat men and
women differently based on women's vulnerability to pregnancy be-
cause, in so doing, it was regulating a preexisting difference rather
than sanctioning an artificial one.84
This reasoning informed the Court's decision in Geduldig v.
Aiello8 5 as well. In Geduldig, the Court rejected a challenge to Califor-
nia's exclusion of pregnancy-related medical expenses from its em-
ployee's insurance plan. 86  The Court reasoned that any
discrimination in the plan worked against "pregnant persons" rather
than against "women," and concluded that discrimination based on
pregnancy was not necessarily discrimination based on gender.87
81 Id. at 496-97 (Steven, J., dissenting).
82 See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L
REv. 387 (1984) (analyzing Michael M. in terms of traditional restrictions on women's
sexuality).
83 See Tracy E. Higgins & Deborah L Tolman, Law, Cultural Media[tion] and Desire in
the Lives of Adolescent Girls, in FEMmISM, LAw, AND THE MEDIA (Martha A. Fineman & Martha
McCluskey eds., forthcoming 1996) (discussing the interplay between the law and media
accounts of teen sexuality and the consequences of teenage girls' vulnerability to sexual
assault).
84 Other cases in which the Court has accepted a biological difference as ajustifica-
tion for gender-based categories include Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (uphold-
ing a Georgia law that permitted unwed mothers but not unwed fathers to sue for wrongful
death of a child) and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (denying a father the right to
protest the adoption of the child where the father had not developed a relationship with
the child).
85 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
86 Id. at 494.
87 Id. at 496 n.20.
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The Court's privileging of biological difference as a justification
for differential treatment links Michael M. and Geduldig. Biology can
both legitimate a classification based on, gender (as it did in Michael
M.), and function independently to define a constitutionally legiti-
mate class (as it did in Geduldig), because the Court treats biological
difference as prior to the cultural construction of the categories of
women and men. Women's vulnerability to pregnancy justified Cali-
fornia's gender-based statutory rape law because the law reflected a
natural or real difference that preexists politics. Similarly, the as-
sumption that biology precedes gender justified the Court's refusal to
equate the targeting of biological difference in Geduldig with the
targeting of women as a group.
Despite the Court's efforts to anchor gender in biology, a com-
parison of the Court's treatment of biological difference in Michael M,
and Geduldig highlights the indeterminacy of biology as a guide to
gender difference. In Michael M., women's vulnerability to pregnancy
constituted a legitimate basis for California's circumscription of teen-
age girls' but not teenage boys' sexual agency88 because "[oinly wo-
men may become pregnant."8 9 Thus, the Court in Michael M. treated
the class of women and the class of potentially pregnant persons as
coextensive. In contrast, in Geduldig, the Supreme Court emphasized
the difference between these two classes, insisting that "[t]he lack of
identity between [pregnancy] and gender as such... becomes clear
upon the most cursory analysis."90 California's plan "divide[d] poten-
tial recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons."91 That the disadvantaged group contained only women was
irrelevant.
This tension between the Court's position in Michael M., in which
it posits a connection between pregnancy and womanhood, and in
Geduldig, in which it assumes their separation, highlights the signifi-
cance of the Court's interpretation of biology in particular contexts.
In Michael M., the Court chooses to assign legal significance to the
effect women's vulnerability to pregnancy may have on their sexual
choices. In so doing, it affirms California's role in reinforcing that
effect by limiting those choices. In Geduldig, the Court chooses not to
assign legal significance to the effect women's vulnerability to preg-
nancy may have on their employment choices. In so doing, it ignores
California's role as employer in reinforcing that effect. Thus, the
88 Although the parties and the Court analyzed Michael M as presenting an issue of
discrimination against men, feminists have suggested that gender-specific statutory rape
laws also discriminate against women by disabling young women from engaging in consen-
sual sex. See Olsen, supra note 82, at 418-21.
89 Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471.




Court's treatment of pregnancy in these two cases illustrates the de-
gree to which biological facts, like social facts, are constituted by the
legal significance assigned to them. Nonetheless, by assuming that bi-
ology determines gender difference apart from social, legal, and polit-
ical frameworks, the Court's analysis effectively obscures its own
participation in the creation of gender difference.
B. "By Reason of Their Sex": Defining Equality, Recognizing
Misogyny
So long as the Court treats gender as a constitutionally valid basis
for differential treatment, at least under some circumstances, it must
determine which gender differences are sufficient to justify such treat-
ment. This task precipitates a crisis of legitimacy for the Court: Upon
what basis may the Court determine the validity of gender categories?
Against what standard may they be measured? What are the implica-
tions of adopting a particular standard?
As the preceding section argued, rather than articulating and de-
fending a normative standard of gender equality that takes into ac-
count gender difference, the Court has adopted a standard that it
assumes is external to its interpretive framework-biological differ-
ence. The Court's treatment of biological difference provides a basis
for separating true accounts of gender from false ones, thereby al-
lowing the Court to distance itself from gender politics. This objective
or foundationalist mode of analysis has two important consequences.
First, it obscures the degree to which the meaning of biological differ-
ence is dependent upon the cultural framework in which it is under-
stood. Second, it gives the Court a stake in defending the neutrality of
biological difference. In effect, the Court's analysis produces the
gendered subject and then conceals that production, preserving gen-
der difference as a prepolitical standard that masks its own regulatory
function.
When the Court cites biological difference as the justification for
the legal categories man and woman, as in Michael M., the Court treats
those categories as adequately determined by biological sexual differ-
ence. In such cases, the Court's assumption that biology has a mean-
ing that is both coherent and prepolitical obscures the degree to
which the biological categories themselves are socially constructed. 92
92 The claim that sexuality, gender, or any other condition is "socially constructed"
has sometimes been misunderstood within the legal academy as meaning that those condi-
tions are somehow not real. See e.g., Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romantism: The
Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 131, 131 (noting common disclaimer concerning the
limits of radical relativism); Patricia Williams, Remarks at Yale Law School Legal Theory
Workshop (May 5, 1994) ("Don't get me wrong, I believe in facts-I don't deconstruct all
the way down.") Nevertheless, the claim that a condition is socially constructed does not
deny the lived implications of the condition. Rather, it calls attention to the way facts are
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The question of whether and how biology preexists law is more imme-
diate when a biological characteristic, rather than an explicitly gen-
der-based category, serves as the marker for differential treatment, as
did pregnancy in Geduldig v. Aiello. In Geduldig, and more recently in
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,93 gender is not a proxy for
biological difference. Rather, biological difference itself is called into
question, and the Court is forced to consider directly its connection to
gender.
In Geduldig and Bray, biology is in the foreground, gender in the
background, and the connection between the two is expressly posed.
The Supreme Court's analysis in these cases illustrates how privileging
biology as a determinant of gender difference conceals the contin-
gency of biological facts themselves. By assuming that biological cate-
gories based on sex-specific traits do not necessarily implicate gender,
the Court preserves biological difference as a prepolitical measure of
gender difference. Yet, in preserving biology as a guide to gender dif-
ferences, the Court limits the scope of its conception of gender equal-
ity. This Section explores the Court's reliance on biological
difference in Bray and illustrates how that reliance informs not only its
evaluation of legislative categories but its perception of discriminatory
intent as well.
In Bray, the Alexandria Women's Health Clinic sought to enjoin
the anti-abortion group Operation Rescue from conducting clinic
blockades in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.94 It invoked
federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), commonly known as
the Ku Klux Klan Act.95 This Act provides a federal cause of action
produced and the exercise of power in that production. SeeJuDrrH BUTLER, BODIES THAT
MATrr xi (1993). Thus, the claim that biology is socially constructed simply means that it
is inevitably shaped by the social and historical context in which it exists.
93 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
94 Id. at 758. One tactic of anti-abortion activists has been to take direct action against
clinics'that provide abortion services. Groups such as Operation Rescue blockade doors,
harass patients, destroy equipment, and threaten health care workers. See Felicity Bar-
ringer, Abortion Clinics Preparing for More Vwlence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, atAl (describ-
ing escalation of violence at abortion clinics and clinics' efforts to safeguard medical
personnel). As the violence has escalated, clinics and abortion rights activists have them-
selves engaged in direct action, escorting patients to and from clinics and staging counter-
demonstrations. In addition, they have sought protection from the courts.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bray, Congress passed the Federal Access
to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) which creates a federal cause of action for women harmed
by the blockades and empowers federal courts to grant injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. § 248
(1994). Significantly, FACE contains no requirement that the action be motivated by dis-
criminatory animus.
95 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriv-
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws.., the party so injured or deprived may have an
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against persons conspiring for the purpose of denying equal protec-
tion of the laws.96 In earlier cases interpreting the Act, the Supreme
Court had held that in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation
of § 1985(3), a plaintiff must show, among other things, that "some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory ani-
mus [lay] behind the conspirators' action."97 Assuming arguendo that
"otherwise class-based" includes women,98 the Court in Bray squarely
faced the question of whether Operation Rescue's clinic blockades
were motivated by discriminatory animus against women.99 Thus, the
case raised difficult questions concerning the definition of woman for
the purposes of identifying anti-woman animus: Does Operation Res-
cue's anti-abortion protesting necessarily reflect such animus? What is
the significance of the conflicts among women in the particular case
or within the abortion debate more broadly? In short, who gets to
define womanhood? Answering these questions required a theory of
the relationship between abortion and womanhood, between biology
and gender politics.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia defined anti-woman ani-
mus as a "purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex,"100
whether or not that purpose reflects malicious motive. Thus, whether
Operation Rescue's illegal blockades' 01 fell within the scope of § 1985
depended less upon the state of mind of the conspirators than upon
the Court's interpretation of their actions. The Court had to decide
whether targeting pregnant women seeking abortion was activity moti-
vated "by reason of their sex."10 2 Given that biological differences in
male and female reproductive capacity serve as the principal and over-
riding cultural marker for gender, 03 targeting persons according to
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or depriva-
tion, against one or more of the conspirators.
96 The district court held that Operation Rescue had violated § 1985(3) by conspiring
to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The court subse-
quently enjoined petitioners from trespassing on, or obstructing access to, abortion clinics
in the Washington, D.C. area. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp.
1483 (E.D. Va. 1989). The Fourth Circuit affirmed. National Org. for Women v. Opera-
tion Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider whether § 1985(3) provides a federal cause of action against persons obstructing
access to abortion clinics. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 498 U.S. 1119
(1991).
97 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
98 113 S. Ct. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99 Id. at 757-58.
100 Id. at 759.
101 Whether or not Operation Rescue's blockades fell within the scope of § 1985(3),
they were illegal under state law.
102 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 759 (1993).
103 See, e.g., Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306, 1323, 1325 (P.DA 1970) (describing an
individual's sex as "fixed at birth" and defining a woman as one "naturally capable of per-
forming the essential role of a woman in marriage"). For a discussion of the biological and
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their reproductive capacity would seem to imply a sex-based motive. 10 4
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia dismissed the argument that activity
against pregnant persons is activity that targets women by reason of
their sex.10 5 He invoked Geduldig and its distinction between a class of
"potentially pregnant persons" and a class of "women."106 According
to Justice Scalia, to target women based on their reproductive choices
is not necessarily to target them based on their womanhood, that is, by
reason of their sex. Biology, including reproductive capacity, exists in-
dependent of gender categories and is analytically separate from
them.
Justice Scalia acknowledged that targeting biology may implicate
gender under some circumstances. He suggested that anti-abortion
activity can indicate anti-woman animus if "opposition to abortion can
reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent."' 0 7 In other
words, opposition to abortion does not necessarily constitute anti-
woman animus but may reflect separate underlying misogynous mo-
tives: Operation Rescue may target abortion because of rather than in
spite of its impact on women. Moreover, "s]ome activities," Justice
Scalia explained, "may be such an irrational object of disfavor that, if
they are targeted, and if they also happen to be engaged in exclusively
or predominantly by a particular class of people, an intent to disfavor
that class can readily be presumed." 08 For example, "[a] tax on wear-
ing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews."' 09 Justice Scalia suggested that such
an inference cannot be drawn about the motives of those who would
impose a tax on pregnancy (as in Geduldig) or blockade abortion
clinics.-' 0
Justice Scalia's conclusion that a tax on yarmulkes is discrimina-
tory and that abortion protests are not is not self-evident. The exam-
ples cannot be distinguished either by the specificity of the target or
the severity of the resulting harm. Certainly, yarmulkes are no more
closely identified with Jews than pregnancy is with women-not all
Jews wear yarmulkes and non-Jews may wear them, while most women
become pregnant and no men ever do. Moreover, a tax on yarmulkes
is no more intrusive (arguably much less intrusive) than the denial of
abortion services.
performative aspects of sex role definition, see Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of
Sex Discrimination Law: TheDisaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 1 (1995)
104 See 113 S. Ct. at 801 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting) (arguing that the statute must reach
conspiracies whose motivation is directly related to characteristics unique to that group).
105 Id. at 759.
106 Id. at 760 (despite the legislative override of Geduldig).






Justice Scalia's reasoning necessarily hinged on his treatment of
biological sexual difference as prior to and separate from gender.
That Justice Scalia found taxing yarmulkes and blockading clinics so
evidently different simply reflects his assumption that pregnancy can
be dissociated from womanhood while yarmulke-wearing cannot be
dissociated from Jewishness. He assumes as much because he believes
that pregnancy is separable from gender, that biology is independent
of culture and of law. 1 ' In Bray, as in Geduldig, the Court treated the
content and meaning of biological sexual difference as preexisting
law, as an independent variable in the legal equation. For the Court,
it is a marker of sexual difference that does not necessarily have
gendered implications.
Justice Scalia's unstated reliance on the privileged position of bi-
ology allows him to sidestep the central, and admittedly difficult, ques-
tion the case posed: when do actions that target a characteristic that
defines a group implicate the identity of that group? This question
cannot be answered fully without a theory connecting group charac-
teristics to the social context in which that group is defined-in this
case, an understanding of the meaning of pregnancy and its connec-
tion to women. Justice Scalia offered no such theory. He provided
only an implicit analysis of two signs of difference, yarmulkes and
pregnancy, and asked only whether pregnancy, like yarmulke wearing,
is "such an irrational object of disfavor that.., an intent to disfavor
[women] can readily be presumed.""12
This analysis is flawed in two related ways. First, the effort to
identify a presumption based on the object of disfavor misapprehends
that class-based animus is unavoidably a contextual phenomenon.
Whether the targeting of an action toward a particular class signals
class-based animus depends on the social meaning of the action and
its target: because the wearing of a yarmulke has a certain social
meaning, the targeting of that headwear sends a corresponding
message."13 This is not an inevitable, ahistoric truth, but rather an
111 Cf.JS.B., 114S. Ct. at 1436 n.1 (Scalia,J., dissenting). In his dissentinJ.E.B., Scalia
distinguishes between sex and gender discrimination, noting that "[t]he word 'gender' has
acquired a new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as op-
posed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes." Id. Although he clearly believes
that biological sexual difference and gender difference are distinct, his view of the connec-
tion between the two is less clear in light of his analysis in JE.B. Given that the case fo-
cused on the use of cultural assumptions about the sexes and their behavior as jurors, it
clearly implicated the construction of sexual difference-or more succinctly, gender.
112 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. C. 753, 760 (1993).
1"3 Cf Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that air force prohibi-
tion of nonregulation headwear did not violate the First Amendment free exercise rights of
Jewish servicemembers). In Goldman, the Court rejected the free exercise challenge in
light of the military's "evenhanded" treatment of religious apparel coupled with the
Court's deferential review of military regulations. Id at 509-10.
1558 [Vol. 80:1536
FEMINIST THEORY
interpretation of social relations-relations that must be analyzed in
context, and not through abstract presumptions.
Second, and more fundamentally, whether the targeting of abor-
tion is "irrational" simply misses the point. Justice Scalia stated in
Bray:
[O]pposition to voluntary abortion cannot possibly be considered
such an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism to-
wards) women. Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be de-
nied that there are common and respectable reasons for opposing
it, other than hatred of or condescension toward (or indeed any
view at all concerning) women as a class-as is evident from the fact
that men and women are on both sides of the issue .... 114
Yet not even the staunchest defenders of abortion rights would char-
acterize opposition to abortion as necessarily irrational. Misogyny
need not be the only rational explanation for an action in order for
the Court to conclude that the action has discriminatory meaning and
implications. Nevertheless, framing the question in this way rein-
forces the disconnection between the biological marker of pregnancy
and the politics of gender. In so doing, the Court preserves biology as
a foundation for gender difference that is logically prior to and sepa-
rate from the sphere of gender politics.
As Bray illustrates, the Court's treatment of biological difference
as prepolitical prevents it from considering the complexity of the so-
cial meaning assigned to biological difference. Relying on unstated
and unexamined assumptions of difference, the majority in Bray offers
no account of the relationship between womanhood and abortion.
Moreover, the Court offers no explanation for the premise that chal-
lenging the pregnancy-related choices of women is less problematic
than challenging their career-related choices. Under the Court's
framework, biological differences may justify discrimination in two
ways: They rebut the presumption of gender bias by offering a true
foundation for gender-based classifications (as in Michael M.);'1 5 or,
they render gender bias invisible by eliminating the need for explicitly
gender-based classifications (as in Bray and Geduldig).116 In each situa-
tion, the Court creates an opposition between biology as objective and
gender as subjective, maintaining biology as an uncorrupted measure
of difference.
Over the last century, the Court's assumptions about gender have
shifted from an ideology of separate spheres to a much narrower but
equally problematic ideology of biological difference. What has re-
114 113 S. Ct. at 760.
115 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
116 See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993); Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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mained consistent, however, is the Court's assumption that gender
categories preexist law. This assumption permits the Court's own ide-
ology of gender difference to remain unstated. Yet, despite the
Court's efforts to separate biology and gender, the degree to which a
sex-specific action reflects anti-woman animus-whether it is "objec-
tively invidious"-cannot be determined without a substantive vision
of women's equality.117 Such a vision, in turn, cannot be articulated
without relinquishing the attempt to ground gender difference
outside culture, law, and politics. Women do not preexist legal and
cultural descriptions of womanhood. Instead, the exercise of inter-
pretation, a process in which the Court is an important participant,
recreates the concept of womanhood.
II
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF POSTMODERNISM
A. Identity Politics and Internal Conflict
Just as the Supreme Court has shifted its ideology of gender dif-
ference over time, feminist legal theorists have defined their subject
woman in various ways, both tracking and determining the nature of
legal claims raised on her behalf. The earliest claims for "simple
equality"-equal treatment, equal pay, equal opportunity-depended
only on defining woman as like man but excluded."18 Such a defini-
tion simultaneously avoided the complexities of gender difference
and rhetorically eliminated any justification for different treatment.
This claim of simple equality was consistent with the Supreme Court's
early approach to gender classifications-the identification and elimi-
nation of false stereotypes."19 As the limitations of this approach were
exposed, the definition of woman and explanations of the nature of
her inequality or oppression became more complicated. Indeed, the
Court's decisions in Geduldig and Michael M, highlighted the complex-
ity of the equality puzzle.' 20 Efforts to translate needs surrounding
pregnancy, reproductive freedom, and the threat of sexual violence
117 Justice Scalia's attempt to flee substance for nature or biology in the context of Bray
is consistent with his attempt, evident in his jurisprudence more broadly, to flee substance
for originalism and for the idea of tradition understood as historical fact. See James E.
Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. Riv. 211, 271-72 (1993).
118 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 5 (offering rationale for the equal treatment approach
to pregnancy); Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 99
(acknowledging difficulty in accounting for difference but arguing strategically for simple
equality).
119 See supra part I.A.2.
120 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLuM. L REv. 1118, 1136-50 (1986) (discussing Geduldig);
Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1305-06 (1987)
(discussing Geduldig); Olsen, supra note 82 (discussing Michael M.).
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into claims of right have required more complicated theories of
difference.12'
Even as particular feminist theories of gender difference have
evolved, feminist legal theorists have generally assumed that there
exists some identity, described by the category of woman, that serves
as the source of feminist goals within law and politics and as the sub-
ject of theory.122 Indeed, the structure of identity politics seemingly
necessitates such an assumption, underlying as it does feminism's
claim to speak as and for the group women.12 3 In the legal realm, the
group-based nature of civil rights claims has required increasingly
complex theories of what it might mean to discriminate "by reason of
her sex."' 2 4 Feminist legal theorists therefore have been compelled to
develop a notion of womanhood that can simultaneously describe the
collective experiences of women and translate that description into
legal claims. Such general accounts or "metanarrafives" 12 5 of gender
have lent political coherence to feminism and have served as a basis
for expanding the substantive scope of equality claims for women. 12 6
121 See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming. Abstract Equaliy, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 201
(pregnancy and difference); Finley, supra note 120 (pregnancy and maternity leave policy);
Littleton, supra note 120 (pregnancy and difference); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:
A HistoricalPerspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. RE%.
261 (1992) (abortion); MACKINNON, supra note 5 (sexual harassment, pornography, and
sexual violence).
122 Elizabeth Spelman explains this tendency in the following way:
[A]s feminists, our motivation for thinking, talking, and writing about any
particular woman is that she is a woman; at the same time, the point is not to
talk only about one woman, but about women-any and all women. So the
logic of our inquiry and concern seems to lead us to focus on the "woman-
ness" or womanhood of any or all women, just as the Platonists's interest
directs his explorations ....
ELZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 3
(1988).
123 As Judith Butier explains:
[T]hejuridical formation of language and politics that represents women
as "the subject" of feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a
given version of representationaf politics. And the feminist subject turns
out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is sup-
posed to facilitate its emancipation.
JUDrrH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTI 2 (1990).
124 The Violence Against Women Act illustrates this tendency by including two sepa-
rate standards for proving group-based harm. To establish a claim for damages suffered as
a result of gender-motivated violence, a plaintiff must show that she was targeted on the
basis of her sex and that the act was motivated, at least in part, by anti-woman animus. See
42 U.S.C.A § 13981 (1995). As the legislative history makes clear, in the case of rape, the
woman may be chosen as a victim because of her sex, but the act might not reflect anti-
woman animus. See The Violence Against Women Act, S. Rep. No. 138, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1993).
125 See supra note 4 for an explanation of metanarrative; see also Fraser & Nicholson,
supra note 14, at 27 (comparing feminist with postmodern uses of the concept of
metanarratives).
126 This analytical move, identifying as common or collective those experiences that
have been assumed personal and private, is the goal of feminist consciousness-raising ef-
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Despite the temptation, and arguably the necessity, of articulating
generalizable claims about women, feminist legal theorists have di-
vided over the content of such claims and have struggled to locate an
account of gender that is credible. 127 Just as the Supreme Court has
attempted to ground its gender analysis outside the contestable realm
of law and culture, feminist theorists have sought some coherent and
convincing basis for offering better accounts of women's lives. Like
the Court, some feminists, including feminist legal theorists, seem to
be motivated in this endeavor by a desire to root gender outside of
politics, to describe a connection among women that precedes
feminism.128
Although feminist legal theorists have effectively criticized the
Court's approach to gender by exposing the partiality of its assump-
tions, they have frequently done so by offering a fuller theory of gen-
der difference, an alternative "metanarrative" that does not rely on a
problematic privileging of biology.129 In so doing feminists have faced
their own crisis of authority, one that stems from the problem of ac-
counting for differences amongwomen rather than differences between
men and women. 130 Among women, indeed among feminists, who
forts. Indeed, the politicization of these shared experiences is reflected in the slogan "the
personal is political." In the legal realm, the translation of private harms into collective
harms has led to their recognition and regulation. A good example is Catharine MacKin-
non's redescription of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. See CAT-ArNE A.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). Nevertheless, the presump-
tion of common experience has created divisions within feminist politics and problems for
feminist theory.
127 See, e.g., Catharine A. Macinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ.
1281 (1991) (describing women's inequality largely in terms of sexual vulnerability); Robin
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cmi. L. REV. 1 (1988) (positing an existential gender
difference based on women's experience of connection); Becker, supra note 121 (discuss-
ing the problems with a single meta-theory and advocating a contextual and strategic ap-
proach); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1985) (positing sameness between men and women qualified by biologi-
cally-driven "episodic" differences); Law, supra note 50 (analyzing generally the problems
gender categories present in constitutional interpretation).
128 Ellen Rooney has described this tendency as motivated by a "desire that what unites
us (as feminists) pre-exist our desire to be joined; something that stands outside our own
alliances may authorize them and empower us to speak notjust a feminists but as women."
Ellen Rooney, In a Word. Interview, in THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE 152 (Naomi Schor &
Elizabeth Weed eds., 1994).
129 See, e.g., BEYOND EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE: CITIZENSHIP, FEMINIST POLITICS AND FE-
MALE SUBJECTVnITY (Gisela Bock & SusanJames eds., 1992); MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 32;
THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990); Lit-
tleton, supra note 120.
130 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, FeministJurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S LJ. 199 (1989) (arguing that feminists must locate their theory in women's expe-
rience in order fully to account for differences); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (analyzing how black women's expe-
rience is eclipsed by focusing either on race or gender as distinct categories); Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (arguing
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has authority to speak on woman's behalf? This section explores this
question as it is raised in feminist theory generaly and in Bray
specifically.
1. Telling Woman's Story
The invocation of the category woman necessarily implies a claim
about the descriptive content of the term, a claim that generates de-
bate and division among feminists.131 Thus, just as the Supreme
Court confronts the dilemma of simultaneously rejecting and recreat-
ing gendered categories, so must feminism confront the instability of
the very category it purports to represent. Feminists must consider
whether is it possible to shape the linguistic representation of woman
in a way that meaningfully serves the goals of expanding women's
political representation while avoiding the re-creation of traditional
categories or new divisions.' 3 2 Feminists have sought a broad and
generalizable account of gender difference to provide theoretical co-
herence and a basis for particularized political and legal claims. Yet
the recent history of feminist theory indicates that, with each general
theory of gender, criticism emerges to undermine the validity of the
claims that both underlie and flow from the account. Consequently,
the development of feminist legal theory has been characterized by
that women's experience as women varies along racial lines using the example of rape);
Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989)
(analyzing the work of various feminist theorists to expose racial bias); Martha Minow,
Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988) (stressing the impor-
tance of difference and perspective in generating feminist approaches); SPEuAN, supra
note 122 (same).
131 As Judith Butler has explained:
[Tihe presumed universality and unity of the subject of feminism is effec-
tively undermined by the constraints of the representational discourse in
which it functions. Indeed, the premature insistence on a stable subject of
feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably gener-
ates multiple refusals to accept the category .... [T]he fragmentation
within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from "wo-
men" whom feminism claims to represent suggest the necessary limits of
identity politics.
BUTLER, supra note 123, at 4.
132 Drucilla Cornell has explained the dilemma as follows:
If there is to be feminism at all, as a movement unique to women, we must
rely on a feminine voice and a feminine "reality" that can be identified as
such and correlated with the lives of actual women. Yet all accounts of the
Feminine seem to reset the trap of rigid gender identities, deny the real
differences among women (white women have certainly been reminded of
this danger by women of color), and reflect the history of oppression and
discrimination rather than an ideal to which we ought to aspire.
Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CoNELL L.
Rxv. 644, 644-45 (1990).
CORNELL LAW REViEW
pressures both in favor of and against a general or cross-cultural ac-
count of women's inequality or oppression.133
For example, some feminists have argued that there is a cross-
cultural commonality to women's lives based on their capacity to be-
come pregnant and bear children. 34 Perhaps the most significant
and widely cited example of such a theory is Nancy Chodorow's psy-
choanalytic account of mothering. 3 5 In an effort to explain the per-
petuation of sexual oppression, Chodorow focuses on the practice of
mothering and the way that the practice reproduces itself-that is, the
mechanism by which women as mothers produce gendered daughters
and sons.136 Setting forth a psychoanalytic theory of gender identity,
Chodorow argues that gender-stratified parenting practices (female
mothering) create women whose identity is primarily relational and
men whose identity is primarily autonomous.' 3 7
The work of Nancy Chodorow, Carol Gilligan,138 and others is
not premised on biological imperatives nor does it claim (expressly)
to explain gender differences cross-culturally. 139 Nevertheless, as femi-
133 See BUTLER, supra note 123, at 4 (noting this tendency and arguing that such femi-
nist goals "risk failure by refusing to take account of the constitutive powers of their own
representational claims"); Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 14, at 27 (discussing the ten-
dency of feminist theory to identify "constitutive features of sexism that operate cross-
culturally").
134 See, e.g., DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL AR-
RANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE (1976); MARY FIELD BELENKY Er AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF
KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (1986); CAROL GILLiGAN, IN A
DIFF.RENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); SARA RuD-
DICK, MATERNAL THINKING (1989).
135 See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCrION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978) [hereinafter CHODOROW, MOTHERING]; NANCY
CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1989); see also Fraser & Nicholson,
supra note 14, at 28-34 (offering an insightful analysis and postmodern critique of
Chodorow's work).
136 See CHODOROW, MOTHERING, supra note 135, at 57-159 (explaining the psychoana-
lytic effects of female parenting on children).
137 See id. at 173-90 (exploring the consequences of female mothering for adult gender
role formation).
138 The best-known of Gilligan's works is In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women's Development. See GILLIGAN, supra note 134. Gilligan and her colleagues at the
Harvard Graduate School of Education have since published two collections that explore
in greater detail the moral development of women and girls. See MAKING CONNECTIONS
(Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1990); MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WO-
MEN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATION (Carol Gilligan et al. eds.,
1988).
139 Gilligan explains:
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but by theme.
Its association with women is an empirical observation and it is primarily
through women's voices that I trace its development. But this association is
not absolute, and the contrasts between male and female voices are
presented here to highlight a distinction between two modes of thought
and to focus a problem of interpretation rather than to represent a general-
ization about either sex.
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nist legal theorists have imported this work into the legal realm, they
have frequently (and perhaps necessarily) simplified the theories of
difference and generalized the claims in order to posit legal theories
of group-based harm. For example, Robin West has focused on wo-
men's "essential connection" to others through intercourse, reproduc-
tion, and parenting to posit a jurisprudential theory based on
women's sense of "existential 'connection' to other human life."' 4
West criticizes what she characterizes as male jurisprudence, both
traditional and radical, for privileging a male subjectivity as human
subjectivity.141 She does not argue against the notion of an abstract,
generalizable subject per se.' 42 Rather, she suggests that the subject
that both mainstream and critical jurisprudence posit is gendered and
does not reflect the (abstract, generalizable) subject that is woman. 143
This feminine subject is characterized by a "state of connection," lead-
ing her to "value love and intimacy because they express the unity of
self and nature within [her] own sel[f]."' 44 A consequence of this
male-defined jurisprudence is that the law misconceives and, as a re-
sult, undervalues the harms women suffer.145
This metanarrative, what might be called the mothering story, is
attractive to feminists for several reasons. It translates what has been
treated as biological imperative into a sociological and psychoanalytic
account of gender difference, thereby challenging its inevitability
without undermining its explanatory power. In addition, this account
of women, particularly Carol Gilligan's work, simultaneously revalues
women's experience and provides a basis for concrete political claims,
including abortion and maternity rights. 14
Notwithstanding its usefulness and appeal, this effort to describe
a common feminine experience that derives from women's role as
mothers has inevitably produced factionalization and rebellion. 147
GiLIuAN, supra note 134, at 2.
140 West, supra note 127, at 15; see also Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WoMEN's L. J. 81 (1987);
Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CH. LEGAL F. 59.
141 See West, supra note 127, at 5.
142 Id. at 64-70. See Patterson, supra note 10, at 285 (criticizing West for her modernist
assumption that woman "exists prior to being taken up and constituted by legal
discourse").
143 West, supra note 127, at 2 (arguing that the claim that "what separates us is episte-
mologically and morally prior to what connects us-while 'trivially true' of men, [is] pa-
tently untrue of women").
144 Id. at 40.
145 Id. at 58-72.
146 See, e.g., Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. Rxv. 43 (1990) (offering
defense of rights, including abortion, based on connection and responsibility).
147 See, e.g., MAcKINNON, supra note 6, at 39 (criticizing relational feminism and sug-
gesting that "the damage of sexism is real, and reifying that into differences is an insult to
our possibilities"); Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: RelationalFemi-
nism, Abortion Rights, and theFeminist LegalAgenda, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 858 (1993) (question-
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First, not all women can or wish to be mothers and therefore some
resist a definition of woman as mother as not reflecting their experi-
ence.1 48 Second, not all women experience motherhood in the same
way. Mothering is not consistent cross-culturally or indeed within any
single culture.1 49 Mothering has different social meanings depending
upon one's race, class, marital status, or sexual orientation.150 More-
over, some feminists have argued that to describe the specificity of the
category woman as derivative of her role as mother is to reinforce
traditional notions about women's role that have undermined wo-
men's representation in the political sphere.15'
Mothering is not the only cross-cultural feminine experience that
has been offered as a basis for a feminist metanarrative of gender dif-
ference. Indeed, in feminist legal theory a more important metanar-
rative has been Catharine MacKinnon's theory linking gender
inequality and sexual violence. MacKinnon has premised her theory
of sexual oppression and state power on the constructive force of male
sexuality.' 52 She argues that "[t]he substantive principle governing
the authentic politics of women's personal lives is pervasive powerless-
ness to men, expressed dally ... as sexuality."'53 Focusing on sexual
violence, she articulates a theory of sexual oppression that describes
women's sexuality through their experience of pornography, rape,
ing the view that women's relational qualities lead them to develop a moral perspective
and moral identity different from men's and warning of the implications of such an as-
sumption on the realm of abortion politics); Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited:
Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992) (question-
ing the implications of relational feminism for the protection of women's rights); Jeanne
L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist
Jurispudence, 75 IOwA L REV. 1135, 1141-43 n.12 (1990) (citing an actual subject of one of
Gilligan's studies who challenges Gilligan's readings).
148 See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, OF WoMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTI-
TUTION 249-52 (2d ed. 1986) (questioning the mythology of motherhood and arguing that
"[t]he 'childless woman' and the 'mother' are a false polarity, which has served the institu-
tions of both motherhood and heterosexuality").
149 See SPELMAN, supra note 122, at 80-113.
150 See, e.g., RICH, supra note 148, at 249-52; Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: A
Historical Study of Black Single Mothers and TheirFamilies, in AT THE BouNDARIEs OF THE LAW:
FEmmsM AND LEGAL THEORY 171-87 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds.,
1991); AUDRE LORDE, Man Child: A Black Lesbian Feminist's Response, in SISTER OUTSIDER 72-
80 (1984);
151 See MAcKNNON, supra note 6, at 39 ("Women value care because men have valued
us according to the care we give them, and we could probably use some. Women think in
relational terms because our existence is defined in relation to men."); Schroeder, supra
note 147, at 1137-47;Joan C. Williams, Domesticity as the Dangerous Supplement of Liberalism, 2
J. WOMEN'S HIST. 69 (1991).
152 See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 152
(1990) (describing women's sexuality as "largely a construct of male sexuality searching for
someplace to happen, repression providing the reason for women's inhibition, meaning
unwillingness to be available on demand").
153 See id. at 120.
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and sexual harassment. 54 Powerfully documenting and theorizing
the impact of sexual violence upon women, MacKinnon implies that
women are completely overdetermined by the conditions of their op-
pression and therefore cannot affirmatively experience their own sex-
uality within patriarchy. 55 Thus, she finds it pointless (and even anti-
feminist) to theorize about women's sexuality apart from positing it as
a construct of male dominance. 156 Her analysis assumes the impossi-
bility of female sexual autonomy: women are victims of male power,
male definitions, and male sexuality, with no hope of creating any sex-
ual agency for themselves in this context. 157
This effort to articulate a general account of women's oppression
as rooted in women's sexuality has also led to controversy and division
within feminism. In response to MacKinnon, other feminists have re-
jected the notion that women's sexuality is either unknowable or sim-
ply a product of male dominance. 158 Instead, they have argued the
necessity of developing an understanding of women's sexuality by ob-
taining more information about its range, quality, and complexity-
about the often contradictory nature of women's experiences of sexu-
154 See id. at 127-54. MacKinnon explains:
Taken together and taken seriously, feminist inquiries into the realities of
rape, battery, sexual harassment, incest, child sexual abuse, prostitution,
and pornography answer these questions by suggesting a theory of the sex-
ual mechanism.... Force is sex, not just sexualized; force is the desire
dynamic, notjust a response to the desire object when desire's expression is
frustrated.
Id. at 136.
155 See id. at 138 (explaining that "[w]omen also embrace the standards of women's
place in this regime as 'our own' to varying degrees and in varying voices-as affirmation
of identity and right to pleasure, in order to be loved and approved and paid, in orderjust
to make it through another day").
156 Id. at 135-37. Criticizing the editors of the Diay of the Barnard Conference for
suggesting that women "negotiate sexual pleasure," MacKinnon remarks, "As if 'negotia-
tion' is a form of freedom. As if pleasure and how to get it, rather than dominance and
how to end it, is the 'overall' issue sexuality presents feminism." Id at 135.
157 Despite her reluctance to consider women's sexuality other than as a product of
their oppression, MacKinnon's espousal of feminist method leads her to the conclusion
that women can know and criticize their condition in a local way. She has explained that
"[gliven the pervasiveness of inequality, imagination is the faculty required to think in sex
equality terms." MacKinnon, supra note 127, at 1327. See discussion infra part M.A. But,
she notes, "we cannot know what women not unequal as women would want, how sexuality
would be constructed, how law would relate to society, what form the state would take, or
even if there would be one." Id. at 1328.
158 See, e.g., Carole S. Vance & Ann Barr Snitow, Toward a Conversation About Sex in
Feminism: A Modest Proposal, 10 SIGNS 126, 127 (1984) (noting the emergence of a pro-sex
anti-sex divide and linking it to "deeply different views about women's sexual agency, the
theory of social construction, the connections between sex and gender, and the nature of
representation"); Mariana Valverde, Beyond Gender Dangers and Private Pleasures: Theory and
Ethics in the Sex Debates, 15 Frmisr STUD. 237, 241 (1989) (criticizing MacKinnon for "de-
nying women any position, however precarious, from which to reclaim or invent nonpa-
triarchal sexual desires").
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ality.15 9 They differ in their prescription for legal reform as well, argu-
ing against the regulation of pornography160 and the criminalization
of prostitution.'61
In addition to fostering the very divisiveness they are intended to
quell, both the mothering story and the dominance story operate to
naturalize a particular type of women's experience. For example, the
mothering story explains gender difference by privileging a tradi-
tional Western, heterosexual experience of motherhood within the
nuclear family.162 Similarly, the dominance story privileges women's
accounts of sexual violence while discounting accounts of sexual plea-
sure as problematic, compromised, or even products of false con-
sciousness. 163 To the extent that one account or the other becomes
the "official" feminist story of gender difference, it constitutes the cat-
egory woman in a particular way, accepting some experiences as defin-
itive while excluding others. When feminists aspire to account for
women's oppression through claims of cross-cultural commonality,
they construct the feminist subject through exclusions and, as Judith
Butler has observed, "those excluded domains return to haunt the in-
tegrity and unity of the feminist 'we'." 1'
159 Jana Sawicki, Identity Politics and Sexual Freedom: Foucault and Feminism, in FEMINISM
AND FOUCAULT 177, 187 (Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby eds., 1988) (urging a "politics of
difference" and arguing that "[d]ialogue between women with different sexual preferences
can be opened, not with the aim of eliminating these differences, but rather learning from
them and discovering the basis for coalition building"); Valverde, supra note 158, at 243
(arguing that "[a]ny theory of sexuality must take into account that even as we suffer patri-
archal oppression, we continue to have genuine active desires, and these include, among
others, some women's desires to have intercourse").
160 See, e.g., SEx EXPOSED: SEXUALrTY AND THE PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE (Lynne Segal &
Mary McIntosh eds., 1992); Ellen Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, in POWERS OF
DESIRE: THE PoLuncs OF SEXUALITY (Ann Snitow ed., 1983).
161 See, e.g., Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difficult Issue for Feminists, in SEx WOR:
WRITINGS BY WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 184 (Frederique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander
eds., 1987); Drucilla Cornell, A Defense of Prostitutes' Self-Organization, 1 CARDozo WOMEN'S
L.J. 121, 123-24 (1993); Carlin Meyer, Decriminalizing Prostitution: Liberation orDehumaniza-
tion? 1 CARDozo WOMEN'S L.J. 105 (1993).
162 See CHODOROW, MOTHERING, supra note 135, at 98 (specifying a "core gender iden-
tity" that "stand[s] for the mother's particular psychic structure and relational sense"). But
see SPELMAN, supra note 122, at 80-113 (criticizing Chodorow's theory for inadequately ac-
counting for racial, class, and cultural differences among women).
163 See MACINNON, supra note 152, at 135-37 (criticizing the notion that feminists can
or should concern themselves with women's sexual pleasure or desire under the conditions
of patriarchy). But see Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Authenticity, in AT THE BOUNDA-
RIES OF THE LAw: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 150, at 142 (suggesting that "[i]f
women can overcome patriarchy sufficiently to see their subordination then women should
be able to overcome patriarchy sufficiently to see their freedom").
164 Judith Butier, Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism,"
in FEMINIsrS THEORIZE THE POLmCAL 3, 14 (Judith Butler &Joan Scott eds., 1992).
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2. Questioning the Storyteller
The divisions within feminism surrounding various metanarra-
fives of women's oppression suggest that any effort to give specific
content to the category woman will inevitably generate disagreement
among women. This realization forces reconsideration not only of
the way gender categories are constituted but also of the way in which
we think about the constitution of such categories. Questioning the
idea of woman's identity as such, some feminists have begun to reex-
amine the quest for a general account of oppression. Although many
feminist legal theorists have remained concerned with the imperatives
of identity politics, feminist philosophers and political theorists have
been more willing to challenge the coherence of the category. In so
doing, they have turned increasingly to the antifoundationalist stance
of postmodernism as a basis for social criticism. 165
Postmodernism, broadly defined, rejects the role of philosophy as
a foundation for social criticism. For example, Jean-Francois Lyotard
defines the postmodern condition as one in which the "grand narra-
tives" of legitimation, including narratives of historical progress, scien-
tific rationality, reason, andjustice, are no longer credible. 166 These
modern or Enlightenment accounts yield to a new "postmodern" view
in which social criticism, including moral judgment, exists independ-
ent of any universalist theoretical ground. As Nancy Fraser and Linda
Nicholson explain, "No longer anchored philosophically, the very
shape or character of social criticism changes; it becomes more prag-
matic, ad hoc, contextual, and local."167 This wide-ranging attack on
metaphysics has led to skepticism of any overarching theory ofjustice
and a call for what Lyotard describes as a "justice of multiplicities."168
The postmodern skepticism of grand theory resonates with femi-
nist legal theory's increasing distrust of universal claims about women.
165 For examples of the influence of postmodernism on feminist theory generally, see
BUTLER, supra note 123; FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 14; FEMINIST EPISrEMOLO-
GIES (Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993); FEMrNIsrs THEORIZE THE POLITICAL, supra
note 164; ANNA YEATMAN, POSTMODERN REVISIONINGS OF THE POLITICAL (1994). For exam-
ples of postmodernism's influence on feminist legal theory, see DRUCIuA COR'mu, BE-
YoND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW (1991); Marie
Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing A Poststructuralist Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L
REv. 1129 (1987); Patterson, supra note 13; Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42
STAN. L. REv. 617 (1990);Joan C. Williams, Culture and Certainty: Legal Histoy and the Recon-
structive Project 76 VA. L REv. 713 (1990).
166 LYOTARD, supra note 4, at 27-41.
167 Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 14, at 26. Fraser and Nicholson are careful to point
out the very different commitments that led postmodernists and feminists to embrace an-
tifoundationalist premises. Postmodernists have responded to a crisis in the condition of
philosophy. Feminists have responded to the demands of political practice. Nevertheless,
they argue, the two bodies of theory inform and complement each other.
168 LYOTARD, supra note 4, at 12; see alsoJean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend, The Refer-
ent, and The Proper Name, in DiAcarrcs 4 (Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., Fall 1984).
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Postmodernism suggests that the problem lies not in ensuring that the
representation of women's experience is accurate, but rather in the
concept of representation itself. Sexual difference, however it may be
measured, is irretrievably bound up with gender. In short, gender it-
self is a product of power and language and social institutions, includ-
ing law, not a reality that preexists those structures. Thus, for
postmodern feminist theorists, the problem of accounting for a range
of feminist views and experiences is less an ontological than an episte-
mological difficulty.169
At the same time, postmodernism apparently undermines the
central goal of feminism and other forms of social criticism: the iden-
tification and critique of inequality and injustice that transcend cul-
tural, political, and geographic boundaries. As Fraser and Nicholson
have argued, Lyotard'sjustice of multiplicities not only calls into ques-
tion universalist notions of justice but also renders problematic femi-
nist critique of legal institutions and legal reform outside of narrow,
localized experience. 170 To the extent that postmodernism questions
the use of cross-cultural categories, it threatens to undermine the
identification of broad structures of inequality premised on gender.171
Thus, postmodernism is at once promising and threatening for
feminism. Divisions within feminism over descriptions of women's ex-
perience, coupled with the risk of reinforcing traditional gender roles,
have continued to draw feminists away from broad theories of gender
difference and towards a recognition of the contingency and partiality
of any particular account of gender. By questioning the possibility of
true accounts and emphasizing the constitutive role of language,
postmodernism resonates with feminist critiques of legal accounts of
womanhood.
169 As Drucilla Cornell has explained:
[T]he condition in which the suffering of all women can be "seen" and
"heard," in all of our difference, is that in which the tyranny of established
reality is disrupted and the possibility of further feminine resistance and
the writing of a different version of the story of sexual difference is continu-
ally affirmed.
CORNELL, supra note 165, at 2.
170 It is precisely this disabling of broad social criticism-that has led some feminists to
question the usefulness of postmodern theory for feminism. See, e.g., Kathryn Pyne Addel-
son, Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems, in FEMINISr EPISTEMOLOGIES, Supra note 165, at
265; Sandra Harding, Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques, in FEMINISM/
POSTMODERNISM, supra note 14, at 83 (arguing against complete relinquishment of mod-
ernist notions of epistemology as justificatory strategy); Sandra Harding, Rethinking Stand-
point Epistemology: Wat is "Strong Objectivity"?, in FFaiEmmisr EPISrEMOLOGIES, supra note 165,
at 49 (1993); Sabina Lovibond, Feminism and Postmodernism, in NEw LEFr REVIEw 5 (Nov./
Dec. 1989).
171 See ZILLAH R. ESENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BoDY AND THE LAw 18-19 (1988); Fraser &
Nicholson, supra note 14, at 25.
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At the same time, if postmodernism disables truth claims femi-
nists themselves cannot claim to tell true stories of women's experi-
ence. It is for this reason that some feminists have been ambivalent
about embracing fully the implications of antifoundationalism. Femi-
nists, along with other groups on the margin of power, are reluctant
to relinquish the hope that resort to some standard independent of
politics and culture will strengthen their claims.' 7 2 Those who have
been excluded from power continue to rely upon the possibility that
those empowered who purport to respect that standard will respond
to arguments for their inclusion.'73 Although women have been
largely excluded from the development of Western notions ofjustice
(and indeed at times assumed incapable of reason), resort to claims of
justice and equality has led to identifiable legal gains for women.
Feminists therefore may fear that without an objectively defensible ba-
sis for distinguishing between truth and falsehood, women are left
only with power to dictate the outcome of competing claims of
truth.'7 4 That prospect most frightens those who are oppressed. As
Sabina Lovibond has asked, "How can any one ask me to say goodbye
to 'emancipatory metanarratives' when my own emancipation is still
such a patchy, hit-or-miss affair?"' 7 5
Feminists may also be reluctant to embrace postmodernism be-
cause, despite the difficulty of giving content to the category "woman,"
that category seems necessary to feminist political advocacy.' 7 6 In
172 See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 13, at 1769 (noting the reliance of the powerless on
"claims of objective truth and on the use of existing structures of knowledge to critique
dominant society on its own terms"). In a related context, feminists in the scientific realm
have transformed the theories and practices of these disciplines to create more complete
and less distorted representations of the world. These "less false" stories both in science
and in law have provided useful guides to improving the conditions of women. See Donna
Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of the Partial
Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 575 (1988); Harding, Anti-Enlightenments Critiques, supra note
170, at 83; Helen E. Longino, Subjects, Power, and Knowledge: Description and Prescription in
Feminist Philosophies of Science, in FEMINIST EPIsTmmOLooiEs, supra note 165, at 101.
173 See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and Laws,
107 HARv. L. REV. 714, 742 (1994) (suggesting that "by depriving us of commitments to the
importance of things outside ourselves, skepticism has even deprived us of the information
we need to make sense of social ills and to respond to them in a humanly appropriate
way"); Robin West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1473, 1495 (1990) (warning
that "[t]he practical consequence ... of putting into serious question the authenticity or
falsity of felt preferences and desires, rather than viewing those preferences and desires as
the baseline of our evaluative practices, may well be a form of oppression more dangerous
than the sources of oppression the legislation is meant to address").
174 See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 13, at 1768. Matsuda warns that "[t]he emphasis on
context and provisional truth does not remove the obligation to divide right from wrong
and to retain justice as the goal of theory." Id.
175 Lovibond, supra note 170, at 12.
176 See Butler, supra note 164, at 15 (noting that "[w]ithin feminism, it seems as if there
is some political necessity to speak as and for women"); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, Femi-
nist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse, in FEMINisM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 14, at 324
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other words, the lingering essentialism and tendency toward universal-
izing theoretical claims in feminist legal theory result, at least in part,
from the political utility of making specific claims about women as a
group. The perceived strategic cost of surrendering the claim to nar-
rative authority is a product not only of the political structure but of
the legal structure as well: the protection of civil rights laws is pre-
mised on the allegation of a group-based harm, thereby requiring an
argument structured in terms of the characteristics, needs, and vulner-
abilities of that group. 177 These laws require feminist advocates not
only to structure claims based on an allegation of harm to a particular
woman but also to link that harm to the condition of women as a
group.
Confronted with both the need to offer an authoritative account
of women's experience and the consequences of exclusion implicit in
offering such an account, feminist legal theorists have hoped for a
middle path between postmodernism and foundationalism. They
have revealed and criticized the partiality of law's description of wo-
manhood while maintaining the possibility of a truer description, one
freer from distortion and exclusion. In this sense, feminists' move-
ment between critique and reaffirmation of gender categories paral-
lels the Court's continuing quest for a principled basis for reviewing
gender classifications. In sorting true from false accounts, however,
feminists and the Court face a crisis of authority: Whose descriptions
are valid? From what standpoint can mainstream accounts be criti-
cized as incomplete?
In confronting this crisis of authority, some feminist legal theo-
rists have relied upon the claim that women qua women enjoy a (pre-
sumably shared) form of understanding that is different from that of
men. Drawing upon the work of Chodorow and Gilligan,178 these
feminists maintain that, having been excluded from mainstream legal
theory, women's perspective must be recovered as a measure of wo-
men's experience. Thus, when transported into the realm of legal
theory, Chodorow's and Gilligan's claims of different voice have
tended to become claims of authority. Just as biology functions to free
the Court from political determinations of gender difference, the as-
sumption that women as individuals have privileged access to knowl-
(noting problems created by the categorical treatment of women within feminism and ar-
guing for abandonment of this presumption of ontological integrity).
177 Section 1985(3), which the Court invoked in Bray, is one example of such a statute.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
Others include Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which pros-
cribes discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, and the Violence Against Women
Act, 42 U.S.CA. § 13981(c) (1995), which creates a federal civil remedy for victims of vio-
lence motivated by anti-woman animus.
178 See supra part ILA.
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edge about women's position as a group preserves the innocence of
the feminist critic. She can both criticize the accepted account as par-
tial and offer her own account as authoritative. She need not attend
to the regulatory consequences of her own partial perspective.
For example, Robin West has suggested that women "are more
nurturant, caring, loving and responsible to others than are men."1 7 9
West's argument for attending to women's perspective is not merely
one of process-that women have been left out of the conversation
and should be included-but that women may have a privileged rela-
tionship to certain aspects of lived experience. For West, there is
something that is "women's experience" that exists apart from legal
discourse and against which the adequacy of legal categories may be
measured. Women have access to that experience, and their ac-
counts, or "true stories" of women's lives,'8 0 stand in contrast to the
false or distorted picture that has characterized mainstream legal the-
ory. Thus, West preserves both feminists' critical position with respect
to mainstream accounts and her own privileged position with respect
to knowledge of women's condition. She does not pause to consider
the partiality of her own description or its regulatory implications.
Similarly, Ruth Colker emphasizes the need for women to "strug-
gle against limiting forces in our lives to move toward authenticity."181
She suggests that "[w]ithout a sense of our authentic selves, we would
have no basis for selecting priorities in our feminist struggles."182 Like
the Court's effort to eradicate stereotypes by measuring legal catego-
ries against observed gender differences, for Colker, feminists' task is
to work through the distortion of patriarchal notions of woman to
reach her authentic self. If that authentic self guides feminist commit-
ments, the exercise of power by feminists will be innocent, tracking
and reflecting women's true selves, free from coercion.
B. Pregnancy, Abortion, and the Crisis of Authority
The position of the feminist advocates in Bray illustrates the di-
lemma feminists face in choosing between relinquishing a claim to
narrative authority and offering credible accounts of women's experi-
ence. 8 3 Because the Supreme Court has been largely unwilling to
acknowledge that cultural and political forces necessarily constitute
the social meaning of biological difference, the Court's inquiry in Bray
focused on whether abortion is related to womanhood rather than the
179 West, supra note 127, at 17-18 (citing GiLuGoA, supra note 134, .at 159-60).
180 West, supra note 127, at 64; see also West, Phenomenological Critique, supra note 140, at
144 (urging women to "start speaking the truth about the quality of our internal lives").
181 Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self. A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Politics of
Authenticity, 68 B.U. L REv. 217, 220 (1988).
182 Id.
183 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic, 118 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
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more complicated question of how it is related. By invoking biology as
a putatively objective measure of gender difference, the Court invited
the resolution of the dispute over the connection between abortion
and the category woman through claims of descriptive authority.18 4
The parties and amici were put in the position of offering competing
accounts of the meaning and impact of anti-abortion protests.
Not surprisingly, the authority to speak on behalf of women and
to make claims about the relationship between abortion and women's
equality emerged as a critical source of controversy in the briefs.
Given the requirement of a class-based invidiously discriminatory ani-
mus under § 1985(3),185 the application of the statute to Operation
Rescue's activities seemed inescapably to depend upon plaintiff's abil-
ity to make persuasive claims about the connection between woman-
hood and abortion. Faced with conflicting accounts, NOW and the
Clinic were obliged to offer an interpretation of the meaning of the
blockades independent of the protesters' explanation of their mo-
tives. They therefore attempted to root that interpretation in a source
outside of politics, anchoring it in an ontological truth about the
world and the role of gender.186 Invoking aspects of the mothering
story, NOW and the Clinic argued in their brief that "the capacity to
bear children and the ability to undergo abortion, and the capacity to
make decisions in respect thereto, link all the women who are the
objects of the conspiracy and are a defining characteristic of being a
woman."187 Thus, despite Operation Rescue's insistence that its target
is abortion and not women, this distinction, the respondents argued,
is impossible to draw. Targeting women on the basis of a characteris-
tic that defines them as women, here vulnerability to unwanted preg-
nancy, was sex discrimination under the statute.
184 Id. at 760. Justice Scalia explained:
Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there are com-
mon and respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of or con-
descension toward (or indeed any view at all concerning) women as a
class-as is evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of
the issue, just as men and women are on both sides of petitioners' unlawful
demonstrations.
Id. He thus raises the issue of who may speak for women-those who represent NOW on
behalf of the clinic or those who participate in Operation Rescue's illegal blockades.
185 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
186 See Brief for Respondents at 24-31, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113
S. Ct 753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
187 Id. at 25 (emphasis added). Respondents argue that "[o]nly [women] suffer the
potentially serious health consequences of a delayed or prevented abortion. Where wo-
men suffer a substantial burden that men need not suffer, as they do here, the challenged
conduct is gender-based." Id. at 29 (citation omitted). Yet, in order to move from the fact
that women are disproportionately affected by the blockades to the conclusion that Opera-
tion Rescue intended that effect, respondents must assume a particular connection be-




The Clinic and NOW did not argue that opposition to abortion is
sex discrimination per se. 188 They allowed for the possibility that
some forms of anti-abortion activism (perhaps effected through polit-
ical channels or by encouraging adoption as an alternative) might not
be motivated by and-woman animus, even though that activism would
be directed, by definition, toward women. The critical factor there-
fore seemed to be the forcible blockading and intimidation of wo-
men-coercion rather than persuasion. 189 Nevertheless, they argued
that targeting women to prevent or discourage them from exercising a
right that all women enjoy is a conspiracy to deprive all women of
equal protection and thus a violation of § 1985(3). By focusing on
means rather than motive, the respondents attempted to sidestep the
problem of interpreting anti-abortion efforts in light of gender poli-
tics. In so doing, they sought to avoid the substantive debate over the
meaning of abortion. Instead, they searched, as the Court has done,
for an objective basis against which to assess the legitimacy of Opera-
tion Rescue's actions.
Despite the focus on blockading, NOW and the Clinic could not
have meant literally that every action preventing women from exercis-
ing their right to abortion necessarily reflects anti-woman animus. For
example, feminists would not likely interpret a protest by pro-choice
groups outside a clinic that is known to perform unsafe abortions as
"anti-woman" since the purpose of such a protest would be to protect
women from the threat of harm. Similarly, a labor picket challenging
the payment of lower wages to women clinic workers could not simply
be deemed discrimination even if it had the effect of denying abortion
services to women seeking them. Presumably NOW would object not
to all blockading of clinics regardless of the motive, but rather only to
blockades motivated by the view that even abortions performed safely
are harmful to women (and society generally) and therefore should
be stopped. Such a view is premised on a political belief about the
connection between pregnancy and women's equality, not on an ob-
188 See id. at 24 n.41 (arguing that "petitioners' long argument that opposition to abor-
tion is not the per se equivalent of discrimination against women is off the point [since
t]here is no claim that it is").
189 See id. at 32 (pointing out that Operation Rescue "choose[s] to blockade clinics as a
mob and intimidate the women patients rather than debating women about their choices
and trying to persuade women to their view"). BothJustices O'Connor and Stevens rely on
this point in their dissenting opinions. See Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 802 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting)
(arguing that "in assessing the motivation behind petitioners' actions, the sincerity of their
opposition cannot surmount the manner in which they have chosen to express it"); 113 S.
Ct. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "[p]etitioners in this case form a mob that




jectively discernable truth about women's lives-that women alone are
vulnerable to unwanted pregnancy.190
Similarly, consider feminists who espouse an anti-pornography
position. If, in order to discourage what they perceived as exploita-
tion of women, feminists blockaded an area frequented by women sex
workers who produced pornographic films, could their actions come
within the scope of§ 1985(3) as a conspiracy to deprive the women of
equal protection? Assuming that women alone are targeted, is this a
conspiracy that is motivated by anti-woman animus? The answer de-
pends upon the connection between the production of pornography
and the oppression of women, one of the most difficult and controver-
sial issues within feminist theory and politics.' 9 ' Whether such an ac-
tion reflects anti-woman animus cannot be determined simply by the
fact that women alone are the targets of the conspiracy.
In contrast to NOW and the Clinic, Operation Rescue empha-
sized the difficulty of positing an objective relationship between wo-
manhood and abortion. Rejecting the contention that efforts to
prevent abortion necessarily reflect anti-woman animus, Operation
Rescue argued that the fact that only women can bear children and
therefore only women can undergo abortion is irrelevant. 192
Although abortion protesting may have a disparate impact on women
as a class it does not necessarily reflect anti-woman animus. Focusing
on the subjective intent of the participants in the blockade, petition-
ers insisted that "[t]here is absolutely no reason to believe that [the
protesters] consider abortion essential to female equality, or [that
they] wish to forestall that equality. There is likewise no reason to
believe that considerations of this sort underlay [their] opposition to
abortion."' 93 Whether denial of reproductive services contributes to
190 NOW would likely acknowledge that the relationship between abortion and wo-
men's equality reflects a particular normative vision about the prerequisites for women's
equal citizenship. Nevertheless, NOW distanced itself from this claim in its brief in order
to respond to Operation Rescue's assertion that the relationship between gender and abor-
tion is indeterminate. NOW therefore posits, at least rhetorically, a realm of gender that is
prepolitical.
191 The debate over the regulation of pornography has generated an enormous vol-
ume of feminist scholarship since the mid-1970s and remains one of the most controversial
policy debates within feminism. Compare Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a MoralIssue 2 YALE
L. & POL'Y REv. 321 (1984) with Carol Smart, Unquestionably a Moral Issue: RhetoricalDevices
and Regulatoy Imperatives, in SEX ExposED, supra note 160.
192 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 7, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S.
Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985) (arguing that a claimant "must show discriminatory animus,
not impact").
193 Id. at 9 (criticizing Respondents for "indulg[ing] in unfounded suspicions regard-
ing hypothetical secret motives for petitioners' anti-abortion stance"). Thus, Operation
Rescue attempts to focus the debate on the connection between abortion and women's
equality. Whether abortion protesting reflects anti-woman animus depends upon one's
belief about the centrality of abortion to women's position as a group, an issue that Opera-
tion Rescue believes the Court ought not decide. See id.
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women's inequality is, after all, open to debate. To conclude other-
wise, petitioners insisted, would mean embracing NOW's views as a
matter of law and labeling the entire anti-abortion movement as sex-
ist.194 "Respondents may honestly believe that any threat to the prac-
tice of human abortion is a threat to female equality. But by no means
does Section 1985(3) incorporate respondents' tendentious and con-
troversial point of view into federal law."195 Thus, Operation Rescue's
notion of anti-woman animus is a wholly subjective one, premised on
proof of the particular state of mind of the actor and the actor's no-
tion of the connection between woman and abortion.
Several amicus briefs supporting Operation Rescue also con-
tested the definition of anti-woman animus, highlighting in different
ways the significance of sexual differences and the divisions among
women regarding such differences. For example, the Southern
Center for Law & Ethics suggested that it is NOW's position, not Op-
eration Rescue's, that is misogynist.196 The Center argued that "[t] he
view that womeh need to become relatively more male-like in their sex-
uality, through legal access to abortion, inherently implies that wo-
men are by nature inferior."'197 The contrast between NOW's position
and the Center's argument illustrates the way in which seemingly
fixed biological factors may be interpreted as having radically differ-
ent implications for gender equality. Similarly, Feminists for Life of
America (FFLA) cited nineteenth century feminists' opposition to
194 Brief for Petitioners at 23-24, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993) (No. 90-985). Petitioners argue:
This Court has never suggested that it is the business of a federal court to
embrace, as a matter of law, the political stance and rhetoric of an advocacy
group like respondent National Organization for Women. This Court
should decline respondents' invitation to label the entire pro-life move-
ment, as a matter of law as "sexist."
Id. Thus, Operation Rescue posits a realm of legitimate, rational, and objective legal rea-
soning apart from the political position of advocacy groups such as NOW (and presumably
itself as well).
195 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 10, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S.
Ct 753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
196 Brief for the Southern Center for Law & Ethics as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 15-16, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No.
90-985). The Center suggests that the mere fact of biological difference does not suggest a
hierarchy of values:
While it is true that a man will never experience the burdens of being preg-
nant and giving birth, it is equally true that a man will never experience the
benefits of getting pregnant and giving birth. Men will never experience the
joy, satisfaction, and bonding that carrying and birthing a child can pro-
duce. The fact of difference does not in itself produce a conclusion regard-
ing equality: the judgment of equality is rather a value determination.
Id. Like Operation Rescue, the Center posits a realm of nature that exists independent of
the political construction that groups like NOW choose to place on it. It is this construc-
tion, the Center argues, that distorts the order and that may be discriminatory.
197 Id. at 16.
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abortion and quoted selectively from modem feminist writing to sug-
gest that division exists within the feminist community regarding the
link between opposition to abortion and sex discrimination. 198 FFLA
insisted that the Court not use § 1985(3) to "resolve the political and
cultural dispute over whether opposition to abortion constitutes dis-
crimination against women."' 99 FFLA's position highlighted the con-
tinuing controversy over the social meaning of pregnancy and its
relation to women's equality. Both amicus briefs attempted to chal-
lenge NOW's authority to define for all women the meaning of preg-
nancy and the significance of abortion.
Operation Rescue and its supporters thus acknowledged that the
interpretation of its actions as anti-woman (or not) reflects a political
position concerning the connection between womanhood and preg-
nancy. By challenging the authority of a particular group of feminists
to define what constitutes woman or anti-woman, indeed, by sug-
gesting that such a definition may not be possible at all, the petition-
ers' argument illustrates the danger to feminists of relinquishing
descriptive authority. A definition of discriminatory animus that is
limited to hostility or hatred of women would not include within its
scope a subjectively benign belief that women are suited primarily for
child-rearing and ought not work outside the home.200 Under the
petitioners' definition, the creation and perpetuation of a social struc-
ture in which women are separate and unequal would not reflect dis-
criminatory animus so long as the men supporting the system loved
women or they found women allies such as Jayne Bray. The implica-
tions of such a definition for the scope of civil rights statutes are clear.
NOW cannot concede that the connection between womanhood and
abortion is contingent and political if such a concession would inevita-
bly undermine the authority of its claims. And such a concession will
198 Brief of Feminists for Life of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
10-30, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
FFLA insists that "[t]he nineteenth century founding mothers of the women's movement
did not view legalized abortion as a solution to, but rather, as an abhorrent consequence
of, the oppression and disenfranchisement of women." Id. at 11. Moreover, it insists that
modem feminists as well are divided on the connection between abortion and gender
discrimination. Id. at 29. For a discussion of the position of "pro-life" feminists, see Linda
C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abortion: Women Who Oppose Abortion Rights in the Name
of Feminism, in FEMINIST NIGHTMARES: WOMEN AT ODDS (Susan Ostrov Weisser & Jennifer
Fleischner eds., 1994).
199 FFLA Brief, supra note 198, at 28.
200 Petitioners argue that Randall Terry, the leader of Operation Rescue, "has a loving
relationship with his wife and daughters." Brief for Petitioners at 29, Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985). However, Terry may love his
wife but still insist that she accept full responsibility for raising the children. In fact, in a
speech before representatives of Human Life International, one of the world's largest anti-
abortion organizations, Terry called for making "dads [the] Godly leaders" of the family
with "the woman in submission, raising kids for the glory of God." 1 FRONT LINES RE-
SEARCH 1 (1994) (a publication of Planned Parenthood of America).
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always undermine NOW's claim so long as courts premise legal analy-
sis of gender on the assumption that the meaning of gender is dis-
cernable outside the political or linguistic context.
As the debate in Bray illustrates, feminist legal theorists have
struggled, as has the Court, with the question of narrative authority.
Just as the Court has sought a foundation for distinguishing legitimate
from illegitimate gender-based distinctions, so too have feminist theo-
rists attempted to articulate a credible account of gender difference
and inequality. Challenges to such accounts, especially with regard to
differences among women, have led feminists to reconsider the utility
of cross-cultural theories and to posit gender as socially and politically
contingent. Nevertheless, in the face of challenges such as Operation
Rescue's in Bray, feminists have been reluctant to cede their claim to
authority and have tended to return to essentialist premises. The fail-
ure of NOW's objectivist account of gender difference in Bray suggests
that the way out of the dilemma may be to question the possibility of
objectivity with regard to gender categories rather than to insist upon
feminists' narrative authority.
III
GENDER CONTESTED: POSTMODERNISM AS SOLUTION
OR DISSOLUTION?
The Supreme Court concluded that a legislative classification that
favors men over women in the selection of administrators of estates
was unconstitutional by comparing the assumptions underlying the
classification with a particular account of women's lives.20' In mod-
ernist terms, the assumptions were "false," inaccurate, or outmoded
when compared to "reality," as determined by the truth-defining rules
of legal discourse. Similarly, when feminists in any discipline chal-
lenge accepted androcentric accounts of gender difference by offer-
ing different data on women's experience, they engage in a modernist
critique of those accounts as false or incomplete.20 2 Under this pre-
vailing methodology, truth claims appear to be true because they con-
form to the truth-defining rules of the dominant discourse-what
Nancy Fraser has called "the socio-cultural means of interpretation
and communication."203
201 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
202 For example, in the natural sciences, feminist empiricists have argued that femi-
nism within the scientific community makes better science possible by revealing biases that
obscure knowledge and distort observation. See, e.g., Marcia Millman & Rosabeth Moss
Kanter, Introduction to ANOTHER VOICE: FtmmiST PERSPECRIVES ON SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE vii (Marcia Millman & Rosabeth Moss Kanter eds., 1975).
203 Nancy Fraser, Toward A Discourse Ethic of Solidarity, 5 PRAMxS INT'L 425 (1986). Fra-
ser offers the following description of these cultural vocabularies:
19951 1579
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
This mode of analysis, used both by the Court and by feminists,
has served as a basis for significant gains for women. Nevertheless, as I
have argued in Parts I and II, modernist critiques create problems for
feminist analysis in several ways. First, they omit (or ignore) the de-
gree to which the alternative account is itself partial and constituted
through exclusionary choices. Second, they obscure the degree to
which feminist critics, in offering such accounts, participate in the re-
production of the category woman as the subject of law and feminist
theory. Finally, modernist critiques are bound by their own rules of
truth-telling.20 4 To the extent that the feminist subject is constituted
by the political or legal system upon which she relies for her emanci-
pation, the efforts of the feminist critic on her behalf will be limited
by the norms of that system.205 This Part explores alternative
postmodern or antifoundationalist modes of argument which empha-
size questions of contingency and authority. More importantly, it asks
what feminists might gain and lose from redefining the subject
through such a departure from the rules.
A. Embracing the Postmodern: The End of Innocence
Substituting antifoundationalist assumptions of contingency and
social construction for objectivist accounts of gender requires the
abandonment of, or at least the qualification of, the language of truth-
telling.20 6 It entails the acknowledgment that all accounts of woman
By socio-cultural means of interpretation and communication I mean
things like: the officially recognized vocabularies in which one can press
claims; the idioms available for interpreting and communicating one's
needs; the established narrative conventions available for constructing the
individual and collective histories which are constitutive of social identity;
the paradigms of argumentation accepted as authoritative in adjudicating
conflicting claims ....
Id.
204 Jean-Francois Lyotard explores these limits in the following explanation of legiti-
mation and language:
It is useful to make the following three observations about language-games.
The first is that their rules do not carry within themselves their own legiti-
mation, but are the object of a contract, explicit or not, between players
(which is not to say that the players invent the rules). The second is that if
there are no rules, there is no game, that a "move" or utterance that does
not satisfy the rules does not belong to the game they define. The third
remark is suggested by what has just been said: every utterance should be
thought of as a "move" in the game.
LyOTARD, supra note 4, at 10 (citation omitted). Of course, this does not suggest that free-
dom from the rules of discourse is possible-as Lyotard suggests, without rules, there can
be no game. Nevertheless, postmodernism insists upon recognition of the constraints the
rules impose and upon freeing the imagination to compose alternative rules.
205 Or, as Audre Lorde has explained, "[T]he master's tools will never dismantle the
master's house." LoRDE, supra note 150, at 112 (comments at "The Personal and the Polit-
ical Panel," Second Sex Conference, New York, Sept. 29, 1979).
206 In explaining the usefulness of pragmatism to the feminist project, Richard Rorty
recommends that feminists eschew the language of truth-telling-
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are partial and contingent. More importantly, however, it entails a
recognition that to choose among such partial accounts is an exercise
of power.207 Such a recognition does not imply that principled
choices cannot be made but rather that they cannot be made inno-
cently.208 Both the judge and the critic must investigate, acknowledge,
and accept responsibility for the exclusionary implications of their
choices rather than treating their assumptions as preexisting and
fixed.
Consider, for example, Justice Scalia's explanation in Bray of
what it might mean to target women "by reason of their sex."209 Making
clear that anti-woman animus does not require a hostile motive, he
suggested that "the purpose of 'saving' women because they are women
from a combative, aggressive profession such as the practice of law"210
would be "objectively invidious."211 Justice Scalia may have viewed this
position as obvious in 1993. However, in 1873, another Associate Jus-
tice interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment (which like § 1985(3)
was a creation of the Reconstruction Congress) reached the opposite
conclusion.2 12 AsJustice Bradley explained in Bradwell 213 "[t]he natu-
ral and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life."214 Thus,
what the Court deems "objectively invidious" discrimination depends
necessarily upon its assumptions about the relevance of gender in a
[D]o not charge a current social practice or a currently spoken language
with being unfaithful to reality, with getting things wrong. Do not criticize
it as a result of ideology or prejudice, where these are tacitly contrasted with
your own employment of a truth-tracking faculty called "reason" or a neu-
tral method called "disinterested observation." Do not even criticize it as
"unjust" if "unjust" is supposed to mean more than "sometimes incoherent
even on its own terms."
Rorty, supra note 12, at 242.
207 Jane Flax urges recognition of this exercise of power when she warns that
"[sipeaking in knowledge's voice or on its behalf, we can avoid taking responsibility for
locating our contingent selves as the producers of knowledge and truth claims." Jane Flax,
The End of Innocence, in FEMINIrS THEORIZE THE POLIICAL, supra note 164, at 445, 458.
208 Jane Flax describes the modernist project as a "dream[] of innocence," a quest for
innocent knowledge. She defines innocent knowledge as
the discovery of some sort of truth which can tell us how to act in the world
in ways that benefit or are for the (at least ultimate) good of all. Those
whose actions are grounded in or informed by such truth will also have their
innocence guaranteed. They can only do good, not harm, to others.
Id. at 446-47.
209 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 759 (1993).
210 Id.
211 Id.





particular context, assumptions that have regulatory implications,
whether or not those implications are acknowledged. 215
Shifting from an assumption of objectivity to a recognition of
contingency would require the Court to articulate its assumptions
about gendered categories and grapple with its own responsibility for
assigning (or reassigning) meaning to particular markers of differ-
ence. Its analysis of gender would no longer take the form of measur-
ing possibly "false" or "inaccurate" assumptions against an underlying
reality of gender difference. Positing a prepolitical measure of gender
difference, whether rooted in biology, social norms, or natural law,
would be suspect. Instead, the Court would have to acknowledge that
biological differences do not preexist the interpretive frame of legal
discourse. Recognizing the contingency of its own assumptions would
leave the Court with no prior rule or logic of gender. Its task would
then be to choose explicitly among competing constructions of gen-
der based on a theory about each construction's relationship to sub-
stantive commitments to justice and equality.
Antifoundationalist premises do not make such choices impossi-
ble or arbitrary, nor do they, by denying the existence of objective
standards, insulate those choices from critique. Rather, the recogni-
tion of contingency simply compels the Court and other participants
in the juridical system to recognize the degree to which they produce
the subjects that they evaluate and adjudicate.21 6 In cases like Bray, in
which the political meaning of a gendered trait is directly contested,
the Court would have to acknowledge its own participation in the re-
creation of meaning. The Court could not avoid this responsibility by
refusing to choose among competing accounts of the relationship be-
tween pregnancy and gender or simply invoking the standard of bio-
logical fact. The majority's position, that abortion has nothing
necessarily to do with the politics of gender, would not appear neutral
in any sense. Rather, the Court would have to concede that by sepa-
215 Although it seems clear that the Court would decide Bradwell differently today, it is
unlikely that the Court would view exclusion of women from military combat in the same
light as their exclusion from legal practice. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76 (1981)
(upholding male-only draft registration because "[w] omen as a group... unlike men as a
group, are not eligible for combat"). The motivation behind excluding women from com-
bat may be benign, based on a desire to save women "from a combative, aggressive profes-
sion." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759. Whether the Court would find such an exclusion "objectively
invidious" would depend upon the Court's understanding of the relevance of gender in
the two situations. The distinction between courtroom battles and military battles turns
simply on the Court's view of women as lawyers and as soldiers.
216 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISToRy OF SEXUALITY, AN INTRODUCTION, VOLUME I
135-59 (Robert Hurley trans., 1980) (discussing the relationship between juridical and pro-
ductive law). Highlighting his point of the regulatory force of institutions including law,
Foucault asks, "Is 'sex' really the anchorage point that supports the manifestations of sexu-
ality, or is it not rather a complex idea that was formed inside the deployment of sexual-
ity?" Id. at 152.
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rating abortion from gender politics, it changes the rules within legal
discourse concerning truth claims about gender, and in so doing, al-
ters the power relations that are constituted within that discourse.
Significantly, it is in the context of abortion that the Supreme
Court has come closest to acknowledging its own exercise of power in
the regulation of gender. In the joint opinion of Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 1 7 the Court de-
clined to overrule what it termed the "essence of Roe's original deci-
sion."218 In so doing, it acknowledged that its decision in Roe had, in a
very important sense, altered the opportumities for women to define
their lives.219 Thejoint opinion noted that "[tihe ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." 220
At the same time, it acknowledged the political nature of its resolution
of the abortion controversy-indeed it cites the politicization of Roe as
partial justification of its decision in Casey. In a remarkable passage,
the three justices wrote:
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a
case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive contro-
versy reflected in Roe... its decision has a dimension that the reso-
lution of the normal case does not carry....
... A decision to overrule Rods essential holding under the
existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the
cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legiti-
macy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law.22 1
217 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
218 Id. at 2816.
219 See id. at 2809; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing that a woman's
decision to terminate a pregnancy falls within the sphere of decisions that the right of
privacy protects).
220 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2797. In addition to joining the joint opinion, both Blackmun
and Stevens emphasized in their opinions in Casey the significance of reproductive choice
to women's equality. See 112 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy also
implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality."); 112 S. Ct. at 2842 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Part of the constitutional liberty to choose is
the equal dignity to which each of us is entitled.").
Feminists have long advocated an equality-based rationale for abortion rights. See, e.g.,
MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 93-102; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts On Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375 (1985); Law, supra note 50, at 1016-
28. For more recent examples, see Reva Siegel, ReasoningFrom the Body: A HistoricalPerspec-
tive on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STu. L. RFv. 261 (1992);
MacKinnon, supra note 127, at 1308-24; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIoNAL Lw 1353-59 (2d ed. 1988); Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With
Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 30-44 (1992).
221 112 S. Ct. at 2815-16. In his dissent in Casey, Justice Scalia harshly criticized the
joint opinion its reliance on the controversy surrounding the abortion issue as ajustifica-
tion for upholding the central core of Roe See id. at 2884 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Neverthe-
less, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989),Justice Scalia himself
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Thus, the Court acknowledged the connections among gender poli-
tics, the dispute over abortion, and its own role in regulating gender
in the resolution of that dispute. It confronted the politics of its deci-
sion in Roe and affirmed (implicitly at least) a theory of gender that
connects women's equality and reproductive freedom. 222
Of course, Roe and Casey were not unique in implicating the
Court in the regulation of gender. Rather, at the time of Casey, the
circumstances of national politics and the changing composition of
the Court simply made adherence to its assumption of objectivity im-
possible. At that historical and political moment,22 3 the Court could
no longer pretend to resolve the abortion controversy by resort to
neutral or prepolitical principles of constitutional theory.22 4 This cri-
sis of legitimacy triggered a burst of candor about the Court's own
role. At the same time, the joint opinion made clear that it viewed
Casey as extraordinary: "The Court is not asked to [resolve a national
controversy] often, having thus addressed the Nation only twice in our
lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and Roe."22 5
Nevertheless, whenever the Court reviews gender categories
against a particular set of assumptions about gender difference, it par-
ticipates in the regulation of gender. It does so whether it resolves
strongly contested issues such as the constitutional status of abortion
or reaffirms more widely accepted ideas about gender such as the risk
of unintended pregnancy among teenage girls. Relinquishing its ob-
jectivist mode of analysis would simply require the Court to acknowl-
edge that participation.
cited the political controversy surrounding the issue as a reason to overturn Roe See id. at
535 ("We can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full of mail from the
public, and streets full of demonstrators, urging us-their unelected and life-tenured
judges who have been awarded those extraordinary, undemocratic characteristics precisely
in order that we might follow the law despite the popular will-to follow the popular
will."). In Casey, he clarified his point by suggesting that "[t]he Court would profit...
from giving less attention to the fact of this distressing phenomenon, and more attention to
the cause of it." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222 Justices Blackmun and Stevens were more explicit in their reliance on equality. See
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 112 S.
Ct. at 2842 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, Justice Gins-
burg would likely rely on an equality justification for the protection of abortion rights. See
Ginsburg, supra note 220.
223 The Court handed down its decision in Casey in June of 1992, during a presidential
campaign in which the composition of the Supreme Court had become a significant issue,
especially as it bore on the continued protection of the right to abortion. The issue of
Supreme Court nominations had been further politicized in the wake of the highly publi-
cized confirmation hearings ofJustice Clarence Thomas a few months earlier.
224 But see Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (seeking refuge from value
judgments by recourse to historical fact); see also Fleming, supra note 117, at 265-67 (criti-
cizing Scalia's flight from substance).
225 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
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The implications of postmodernism for both the Court's ap-
proach to gender and feminist legal theory go beyond the mere recog-
nition of the inevitable incompleteness of any specific account of
gender difference. In addition to exposing the partiality of such ac-
counts and the political implications of choosing among them,
postmodernism emphasizes the regulatory role of language and the
interpretive process itself. Beyond the direct regulatory implications
of its decisions in particular cases, the Court's construction of the
legal discourse surrounding gender affects the structure of arguments
raised on women's behalf,226 the kinds of harms that may be trans-
lated into legal claims,227 and even the degree to which those harms
are experienced or acknowledged as violations by the individual. 228
Similarly, feminist legal theorists' critique of and engagement with
this legal discourse regulates the scope of feminist reinterpretations of
women's experience. Thus, for the Court and its feminist critics, to
choose among competing accounts of womanhood is not merely to
reinforce exclusions but to alter the way women experience and ex-
press their lives.
This regulatory effect is a function of language and, more specifi-
cally, the interpretive process itself. If, as postmodemists contend,
language at least partially constitutes the real by describing and nam-
ing it, then interpretation contributes to how the real is known. Un-
derstood in this way, the process of interpretation undermines the
opposition of subject and object, of empirical and normative, by si-
multaneously constructing and reflecting meaning. It limits what we
see and how we think by privileging a particular set of viewpoints.229
226 See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139 (1976) (constructing
pregnancy as an "additional risk, unique to women"). The Court's analysis of the problem
of pregnancy in terms of gender difference led to the long debate among feminists about
special treatment versus equal treatment. In the end, the debate was over whether it was
better for women to choose equality (meaning sameness) and sacrifice their needs or insist
that their needs be met fully and sacrifice the strength of their equality claim. The Court's
original structuring of the debate in terms of sameness and difference meant that neither
strategy was satisfactory.
227 A good example is the Court's shift in approach to sexual harassment from viewing
it as a personal problem that may intrude into the workplace to a form of sex discrimina-
tion. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); MACKINNON, supra note 127.
228 Ruth Hubbard has explained the role of language in defining experience as fol-
lows: "[F]or humans, language plays a major role in generating reality. Without words to
objectify and categorize our sensations and place them in relation to one another, we
cannot evolve a tradition of what is real in the world." Ruth Hubbard, Have Only Men
Evolved?, in Women Look at Biology Looking At Women 7 (Ruth Hubbard et al. eds.,
1979). In defining the terms of legal discourse, the Court helps to regulate the expression
of experience. In his opinion in Casey, Justice Scalia seemed to acknowledge this effect in
his statement that the Court's decision in Roe "created a vast new class of abortion consum-
ers and abortion proponents by eliminating the moral opprobrium that had attached to
the act." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2882 (Scaia, J., dissenting).
229 As Michel Foucault notes, language defines "the limits and the forms of expres-
sibility: What is it possible to speak of?. What has been constituted as the field of dis-
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Thus, when the Court and its critics act upon their (inevitably) contin-
gent knowledge of gender, they both regulate experience and alter it.
If language works in this way, the process of naming and interpreta-
tion has power implications for which the interpreter, whether the
Court or its feminist critics, must assume responsibility.
The abortion debate again serves as an illustration of the role of
both feminists and the Court in constructing the parameters of wo-
men's experience. When courts and feminists define the relationship
between gender and abortion in a particular way, they act as creators
of knowledge, not simply interpreters of fact. Within abortion dis-
course, this creation of knowledge has tended to reflect a particular
political rhetoric, namely that of individual rights and personal lib-
erty. Feminists, philosophers, and ethicists on both sides of the de-
bate have posed the question as a conflict between the rights of the
mother and the rights of the fetus. Hence, they have consciously
structured the question to respond to the norms of debate within
their particular spheres of discourse.230 Yet, in its implementation,
the conflict of rights approach has particular gender, class, and race
implications that the construction of terms has obscured.23' Feminists
have recognized these implications, reexamined the framing of the
moral issues surrounding abortion, and recast the analysis to account
more fully for a broader range of women's experience.232
course?" Michel Foucault, Histoy, Discourse, and Discontinuity, SALMAGUNDI Summer/Fall
1972, at 225.
230 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 152, at 215-34 (discussing the problems of the
feminist claim to equal rights and formal equality within the existing system of gender
hierarchy); Tracy Higgins, Note, Rethinking (M)otherhod: Feminist Theoy and State Regulation
of'Pregnancy, 103 HAuv. L. Rxv. 1325, 1336 (1990) (arguing that "the model of conflicting
rights has undermined the development of effective policy by focusing on the competing
rather than the common needs of the mother and the fetus"). But see Martha Minow,
Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1874 (1987) (defending
rights-based claims and suggesting that "[bly invoking rights, an individual or group claims
the attention of the larger community and its authorities"); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movemen4 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589
(1986) (discussing the political and expressive value of rights discourse).
231 See ROSALIND POLLACK PErcHEsKy, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE xviii-xxi (rev.
ed. 1990) (discussing the manifestation of racism in the abortion debate); ZILLAH P. EISEN-
STEIN, THE COLOR OF GENDER: REIMAGING DEMOCRACY 100-33 (1994) (arguing that "the
connections between racial, sexual, and gender politics are threaded in and through the
core of abortion politics"); cf. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNowL.
EDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 50, 76 (1991) (discussing the
relationship between racial oppression and the control of black women's fertility).
232 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 152, at 193 (suggesting that "[i]t is probably no
coincidence that the very things feminism regards as central to the subjection of women-
the very place, the body, the very relations, heterosexual; the very activities, intercourse
and reproduction; and the very feelings, intimate-form the core of privacy doctrine's
coverage"). But see Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 CoLUM.J. GENDER & L. 119
(1992) (defending the right of privacy in arguments for women's reproductive freedom
against charges that privacy is an impoverished concept).
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This interplay of the Court's abortion analysis and feminist cri-
tique illustrates the regulatory consequences of structuring the debate
around a conflict of rights. Apart from the outcome in any particular
case, the debate itself limits the types of harm that can be expressed
within the legal discourse and constructs the experience of pregnancy
and abortion in a particular way. Acknowledging the postmodernist
assumption of the role of language in the construction of experience
would force both feminists and the Court to assume more fully the
responsibility for those consequences.
B. Feminist Epistemology: Telling Better Stories
For the Supreme Court, adopting antifoundationalist assump-
tions would mean abandoning its quest for prepolitical categories of
gender difference and acknowledging the power implications of its
role in adjudicating gender difference. For feminists, it would mean
qualifying the claim to tell true stories about women as a means of
either challenging or supporting those categories.233 A commitment
to antifoundationalist assumptions would lead feminists to continue to
expose as contingent and provisional that which has been assumed to
be necessary and permanent. Yet, feminist theorists could not pur-
port to replace existing partial accounts with more complete or au-
thoritative feminist accounts.234 Feminists would be no more entitled
than the Supreme Court to claim an ideal vantage point from which
to define woman. Instead, feminists would have to acknowledge that
their own accounts of gender are necessarily partial and, like the
Court's, entail choices that operate to exclude certain experiences. 235
233 In exhorting feminists to abandon a commitment to truth claims, I do not mean to
suggest that feminists should not challenge existing accounts of gender. Moreover, I rec-
ognize that such challenges may take the form of allegations of falsehoods.
Even Julia Kristeva, who denies the possibility of the representation of women in lan-
guage acknowledges that "we must use 'we are women' as an advertisement or slogan for
our demands." Julia Kristeva, Woman Can Never Be Defined, in NEw FRENCH FEmiNISMS 137
(Elaine Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron eds., 1981). She warns, however, that "a woman
cannot 'be'; it is something which does not even belong in the order of being. It follows
that a feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with what already exists so that we
may say 'that's not it' and 'that's still not it.' "Id. Richard Rorty makes a similar point when
he quotes Catharine MacKinnon's claim that "woman is not yet the name of a way of being
human." Rorty, supra note 12, at 7. He concedes, however, that "practical politics will
doubtless often require feminists to speak with universalist vulgar." Id. at 13.
234 But see West, supra note 127, at 64 (arguing that the only way to demonstrate the
consequences of women's exclusion from law is "to tell true stories of women's lives").
235 Judith Butler has explained:
In response to the radical exclusion of the category of women from hege-
monic cultural formations on the one hand and the internal critique of the
exclusionary effects of the category form within feminist discourse on the
other, feminist theorists are now confronted with the problem of either
redefining and expanding the category of women itself to become more
inclusive (which requires also the political matter of settling who gets to
CORNELL LAW REVEW
As Part II argues, feminists have been reluctant to acknowledge
.the contingency of their own perspective, fearing that without an ob-
jective standpoint from which to assess the representation of women
in law, feminism loses its critical power.23 6 Yet as the preceding discus-
sion of Bray illustrates, operating within the Supreme Court's modern-
ist paradigm, which posits correspondence between law's story and a
true story of woman's condition, has not necessarily enhanced femi-
nist critique. Feminist claims that a particular account is false or inac-
curate are persuasive only to the degree that the alternative account is
convincing within a particular discourse. The claim that the alterna-
tive account is "true" or representative of women's experience gener-
ally is superfluous. Indeed, such a claim creates another site of
contest: controversy emerges over the authority of a particular femi-
nist voice to represent women.237
Yet if we surrender the modernist conception of truth, how are
we to choose among multiple and conflicting accounts? More pre-
cisely, if postmodernism requires feminists to relinquish the claim to
tell truer stories of women's lives, can feminists nevertheless claim to
tell better stories?
Feminists have reacted to this challenge of postmodernism in at
least two ways. While conceding the contingency of any particular ac-
count of women's experience, some have attempted to preserve femi-
nist narrative authority by privileging feminist method,238 particularly
standpoint epistemology.23 9 Their effort rests on the assumption that
women's stories that are a product of feminist methodology reflect
make the designation and in the name of whom) or to challenge the place
of the category as a part of a feminist normative discourse.
Butler, Gender Troube, supra note 176, at 425. Jane Flax argues that "[t]o take responsibility
is to firmly situate ourselves within contingent and imperfect contexts, to acknowledge
differential privileges of race, gender, geographic location, and sexual identities, and to
resist the delusory and dangerous recurrent hope of redemption to a world not of our own
making." Flax, supra note 207, at 460.
236 Indeed, Lovibond suggests that feminism would lose its purpose altogether. She
argues that "[i]t would be arbitrary to work for sexual equality unless one believed that
human society was disfigured by inequality as suc." Lovibond, supra note 170, at 28.
237 See, e.g., CoNizucrs IN FEMINISM (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990);
FEMINISr NIGHMARES: WOMEN AT ODDS, supra note 198. Several popular works that chal-
lenge feminists' "orthodoxy" and raise the question of who speaks for women include:
CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, WHO STOLE FEMINISM?: How WOMEN HAVE BETRAYED WOMEN
(1994); KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFrER: SEx, FEAR, AND FEMINISM (1993); NAOMI
WOLF, Fiax WITH FnRE: THE NEW FEMALE POWER AND How TO USE IT (1993).
238 Defending feminist epistemologies, Sandra Harding explains, "[T]he development
of feminist justificatory strategies [addresses] not only the problem of justifying one's
claims to others, but also the problem ofjustifying them to oneself and to those who might
prove sympathetic to feminist goals." Harding, Anti-Enlightenment Citiques, supra note 170,
at 89.
239 But see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 867-88
(199). Bartlett discusses and rejects standpoint epistemology and postmodernism and pro-
poses instead a concept of "positional knowing." She argues that "[plositionality recon-
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women's experience more completely, in a form undistorted (or less
distorted) by patriarchy. For example, Catharine MacKinnon,
although suggesting that sexuality is a product of social construc-
tion,24° posits an identity of woman that has been distorted or silenced
under patriarchy and that may be discoverable (albeit imperfectly)
through feminist method.2 41 These accounts of women's experience
are better, she suggests, not because they are truer to some ideal
woman but simply because they are less constrained by the false con-
sciousness produced by women's oppression.2 42
MacKinnon's reliance on the concept of social construction dis-
tinguishes her standpoint epistemology from more essentialist (and
less postmodern) versions.2 45 She suggests that feminists should use
consciousness-raising to expose the role of patriarchy in constructing
women's experience and to begin to articulate a transformative vision
of gender. She does not directly posit the existence of an authentic
self that may be revealed through process. Nevertheless, her reliance
on consciousness-raising does imply a belief in women's access to
truth or at least to knowledge that may legitimately be privileged.
Other feminists have relied less on claims about women's rela-
tionship to truth than on the value of fuller process. Conceding that
feminists cannot claim to know what is true, they suggest simply that
more inclusive accounts or theories are better than less inclusive ones.
Thus, they emphasize the inclusion of women's voices in the process,
whether it be scientific or legal. For example, feminists in the natural
sciences have argued that the inclusion of women as researchers and
as research subjects has improved the development of scientific theory
by making it more complete than it once was. 244 In the legal realm,
ciles the existence of reliable, experience-based grounds for assertions of truth upon which
politics should be based, with the need to question and improve these grounds." Id. at 884.
240 See MACKYNNON, supra note 152, at 128-29.
241 See id. at 96 (describing consciousness-raising as "unraveling and reordering what
every woman 'knows' because she has lived it"). Although MacKinnon does not explicitly
claim that through consciousness-raising women uncover the reality of their oppression,
she does imply as much by rejecting, for example, affirmative accounts of women's sexual-
ity and experience of nonsubordination as products of false consciousness. See id. at 135.
See Colker, supra note 163, at 13547 (criticizing MacKinnon for crediting women's account
of oppression while discounting their accounts of pleasure); see also Tracy Higgins, Book
Review: Toward A Feminist Theory of the State, 13 HAzv. WoMEN's LJ. 325 (1990) (noting
essentialism implicit in MacKinnon's theory of sexuality and subordination).
242 Compare MAcKN NoN, supra note 152, at 135 (rejecting women's accounts of sexual
pleasure as products of sexual oppression) and MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 39 (criticizing
analysis of sexual difference as "reaffirming what we have been") with MACKNNON, supra
note 152, at 115 (explaining that "[t]reating some women's views as merely wrong, because
they are unconscious conditioned reflections of oppression and thus complicitous in it,
posits objective ground").
243 See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing West and Colker).
244 See Haraway, supra note 172; Harding, Anti-Enlightenment Critiques, supra note 170;
Longino, supra note 172.
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Mar Matsuda has argued that a concept of justice that takes into ac-
count the perspective of the subordinated can be accepted as better
or more complete, even within a framework of contingent truth.245
Similarly, Margaret Jane Radin has argued that the deliberate inclu-
sion of marginalized groups serves as an antidote to what she terms
the "bad coherence" problem that renders pragmatism (arguably) in-
different to social injustice.246
None of these efforts resolves the fundamental challenge posed
by postmodernism: How do we argue effectively if we can no longer
claim access to truth? Instead, these efforts attempt to replace a sub-
stantive vision of truth (a "true" definition of woman) with a non-sub-
stantive value scheme. In other words, rather than evaluate an
account of gender against a particular conception of woman, these
approaches encourage us to focus on whether the account is the prod-
uct of a particular methodology or a sufficiently.inclusive process. Of
course, the privileging of such accounts simply reflects a normative
decision-if not a decision about what is true, then a decision that
certain methods or processes are preferred. Thus, we can accept an
account of women's experience that emerges as a product of con-
sciousness-raising as better (or truer) only to the extent that we accept
the value of the methodology. A principle defined through the partic-
ipation of marginalized groups is better (or truer) only to the extent
that we accept broader participation as a component of what defines
truth or justice or legitimacy. Feminist's reliance on method cannot,
therefore, offer an exogenous basis for proving or supporting our sub-
stantive commitments any more than the Supreme Court's reliance
on social science or biology. Rather, the privileging of women's voices
implicit in feminist method simply reflects those commitments.2 47
Moving away from truth claims to process claims only shifts the arena
of debate.
It is not surprising, then, that these approaches cannot defini-
tively resolve conflicts among women's own accounts of their exper-
iences.2 48 Indeed, focusing on such conflicts reveals the degree to
245 See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 13, at 764-68; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987).
246 See Radin, supra note 13, at 1705-11.
247 This is not to say that feminist method is not a legitimate tool for feminists to
explore and evaluate women's accounts of their experience. Rather, feminists must simply
recognize the substantive (and exclusionary) implications of their commitment to method.
248 Despite her own tendency to privilege certain women's accounts over others, Cath-
arine MacKinnon gives perhaps the best statement of the dilemma of feminist
methodology:
Consider the accounts of their own experience given by right-wing women
and lesbian sadomasochists. How can male supremacy be diminishing to
women when women embrace and defend their place in it? How can domi-
nance and submission violate women when women eroticize it Now what
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which debates over both authority and method turn ultimately on sub-
stantive claims. In Bray, both petitioners and respondents conformed
to the truth-defining rules of feminist standpoint epistemology in a
limited sense: they attributed particular authority to the voice of wo-
men and regarded, albeit selectively, the biological sex of the actors in
the blockade confrontations as significant to the question of anti-
woman animus.
Paradoxically, both sides contended that gender was at once de-
terminative of and irrelevant to the identification of anti-woman ani-
mus. Operation Rescue insisted that the participation of women in
the blockades insulated it from the charge of discrimination, sug-
gesting that a position cannot be misogynist so long as it is held by at
least one woman.249 On the other hand, it regarded the gender of the
clinic patients as irrelevant. Operation Rescue's target was abortion,
not women. 250 That women alone were seeking the services of the
clinic or that the reduced availability of abortion services generally
harmed women was incidental to the purpose of the blockade.251
Respondents, in contrast, argued that Operation Rescue's con-
spiracy was designed to deprive women as a group of their constitu-
tionally protected252 right to make and carry out decisions respecting
childbirth. Petitioners rejected the contention that Operation Res-
cue's blockades targeted abortion rather than women, arguing that a
conspiracy against a class of women of childbearing age, pregnant and
seeking help, was a conspiracy against women. "[T]he capacity to
bear children and the ability to undergo abortion, and the capacity to
make decisions in respect thereto, link all women who are the objects
of the conspiracy and are a defining characteristic of being a
is women's point of view? Most responses simply regard some women's
views as "false consciousness" or embrace any version of women's experi-
ence which a biological female claims. Neither an objectivist dismissal not a
subjectivist retreat addresses the issue. Treating some women's views as
merely wrong, because they are unconscious conditioned reflections of op-
pression and thus complicitous in it, posits objective ground.... Both fem-
inism and antifeminism respond to the condition of women, so feminism is
not exempt from devalidation on the same account.
MACYUNNoN, supra note 152, at 115.
249 Brief for Petitioners at 20, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753
(1993) (No. 90-985) (pointing out that "Jayne Bray is a woman"). Scalia picks up on this-
distinction in Bray, pointing out that "men and women are on both sides of the issue [of
abortion] just as men and women are on both sides of petitioners' unlawful demonstra-
tions." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760.
250 Brief for Petitioners at 23, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753
(1993) (No. 90-985).
251 See id. at 17-18 (explaining that the class "does share a common feature-the mem-
bers are each 'seeking abortion'-but this feature represents an activity and not the sort of
characteristic (immutable or otherwise) necessary to define a proper class").
252 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (affirming central core of




woman."253 Thus, respondents rejected the argument that the gender
of the patients was irrelevant. It is impossible, they argued, to target
abortion services without targeting women. At the same time, they
denied the significance of women's participation in the anti-abortion
movement, insisting that "[Jayne Bray's] participation does not turn a
gender-based conspiracy into a gender neutral one."25 4
By selectively emphasizing or disregarding the sex of the subjects
and objects of the protests, both NOW and Operation Rescue invoked
the authority of women's accounts to validate particular claims about
women and abortion. When women's interpretations of their experi-
ence conflicted, feminist method supplied no principled basis upon
which to choose among competing accounts. Standpoint epistemol-
ogy, which privileges women's accounts of their own experience, does
not yield a basis for accepting NOW's claims and rejecting Jayne
Bray's. Moreover, dismissing Jayne Bray's position as co-opted, dis-
torted, or produced by false consciousness implies that an alternative
feminist position is available free from contingency, a claim that can-
not be verified or effectively defended. Similarly, a process that de-
mands the inclusion of the perspectives of marginalized groups does
not lead to a clear outcome in Bray. Neither methodological principle
offers a basis for choosing among these conflicting accounts.
But recognizing the indeterminacy of feminist method does not
leave feminists substantially less equipped to defend one view over an-
other. Feminists are not left merely with relativism because, properly
understood, antifoundationalism undercuts both objectivism and rela-
tivism. Indeed, it is a commitment to foundationalism that leads to
the trap between objectivism on the one hand and relativism on the
other.2 55 Objectivism and relativism are two sides of the same argu-
ment. They both link the legitimacy of knowledge claims to the exis-
tence of neutral principles. Objectivism assumes those principles are
available as a basis for evaluating moral claims. Relativism assumes
that, without such neutral principles, evaluation is problematic if not
impossible.25 6 Thus, beginning from the premise that objectivity is
253 Brief for Respondents at 25, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
254 Brief for Petitioners at 27 n.44, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S.
Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
255 For an explanation of the link between relativism, mutualism, and objectivism, see
RicHARD BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJEcTVSM AND RELATIISM (1983); Frank Michelman, Fore-
word: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REX'. 4 (1986).
256 Professor Martha Nussbaum has made this point as follows:
[T]he collapse into extreme relativism or subjectivism seems to me to
betray a deep attachment to metaphysical realism itself. For it is only to one
who has pinned everything to that hope that its collapse will seem to entail
the collapse of all evaluation-just as it is only to a deeply believing reli-




possible leaves feminism in the middle. The Supreme Court's objec-
tivist approach to gender discounts feminist knowledge claims as polit-
ical because the biological difference (or sameness) cannot fully
account for them. Operation Rescue's relativist approach to defining
discriminatory animus discounts NOW's description of abortion as
simply one among many possible interpretations. Even the most per-
suasive feminist accounts fail to meet the criteria of objective truth on
the one hand or complete consensus on the other. Feminist legal the-
orists must be prepared to challenge the relevance of both criteria by
focusing attention on the necessary partiality of knowledge claims and
the political implications of that partiality.
Thus, rather than leading to the notion that all truths are equal,
feminist antifoundationalism merely emphasizes the role of power in
defining truth or in setting truth-defining rules. For example,
although most feminists (though not all) would agree that reproduc-
tive control is essential to women's equality, the centrality of abortion
rights is not "true" in the sense of deriving from some post-patriarchal
reality. One may deem an equality-based theory of abortion that ac-
counts for differences among women to be better than competing ac-
counts premised on privacy or even anti-choice accounts only to the
extent that it more successfully (meaning more persuasively) trans-
lates the complicated experience of abortion into the terms of legal
discourse.
More generally, relinquishing a representational account of
knowledge transforms feminist arguments from claims of authority to
claims of advocacy. Feminism thus avoids the virtually unanswerable
critique regarding the accuracy of a particular representation of wo-
men's experience. Instead, the validity of a position depends upon
whether it offers a persuasive account of the connection between wo-
men's experience and substantive commitments to equality and jus-
tice. Feminism need not claim to do more than offer such an
account.
In this form, feminist criticism of the Supreme Court's analysis of
gender difference is not an appeal from false appearance to an under-
lying reality. The claim is no longer that the Court's analysis is pre-
mised on an incomplete or inaccurate understanding of woman's
condition. Rather, postmodern feminism insists that by positing and
describing woman, the Court acts to recreate that category, partially
constituting truth rather than innocently identifying it. Its criticism of
the Court's approach is based on an alternative vision, not necessarily
a truer one.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and SocialJustice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essential-




Both the Supreme Court and feminist legal theorists have gener-
ally assumed that woman, however she is defined, preexists legal cate-
gories and have sought to discern her characteristics to guide legal
regulation of gender. This Article has argued that such efforts tend to
obscure the unavoidable role of the critic in the creation and rein-
forcement of gender categories. Both the Court and feminist legal
theorists should abandon arguments that rely on prepolitical concep-
tions of gender difference and should instead attend to the regulatory
consequences of particular, partial conceptions. In so doing, feminist
legal theorists would acknowledge the exercise of power that is im-
plicit in their own efforts to represent women politically and linguisti-
cally. At the same time, conceding the partiality of any particular
account of gender would mitigate the paralyzing critique of incom-
plete representation. By abrogating the search for fixed foundations,
postmodem feminism eliminates both the possibility that an authentic
story can be told and the debate over who has the authority to tell that
story.
1594 [Vol. 80:1536
